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COMPLETE LIST OF ALL PARTIES 
ExxonMobil Corporation and Mobil Exploration and Producing are unaware of 
parties other than those identified in the caption of this Opening Brief of Petitioners. 
1. The Petitioner, ExxonMobil Corporation, shall be referred to herein as 
"ExxonMobil." The official name for Petitioner, Mobil Exploration and 
Producing, is Mobil Exploration and Producing North America, Inc., and 
shall be referred to herein as "MEPNA." ExxonMobil and MEPNA shall 
be referred to collectively as "Petitioners." 
2. The Respondent, Utah State Tax Commission, shall be referred to herein as 
the "Commission." 
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This appeal is from the Order Denying Petitioners' Motion for Summary Judgment 
(the "Order") of the Utah State Tax Commission (the "Commission") issued on 
November 17, 2008 and attached hereto as Addendum 1. This Court has jurisdiction 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(3)(e)(ii). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
A. This appeal can be entirely resolved by addressing the following issue: 
Did the Commission err when it held that ExxonMobil and its wholly-owned 
subsidiary, MEPNA, were not entitled to retroactive application of the ExxonMobil 
decision despite the ExxonMobil Court's declaration that the prospective effect limitation 
applied "to all but ExxonMobil"? ExxonMobil Corp, v. Utah State Tax Comm % 2003 
UT 53 123, 86 P.3d 706, 712. R. 12. A complete copy of the ExxonMobil decision is 
contained in Addendum 2 and will be cited hereafter as "ExxonMobil, % .". 
Standard of review: "Interpreting case law presents a question of law. . . . 
Accordingly, we review the district court's interpretation of our ruling . . . for 
correctness." Houghton v. Dept. of Health, 2005 UT 63, % 32, 125 P.3d 860. 
B. If the Court upholds the Commission's interpretation of ExxonMobil, then, 
and only then, would the Court need to address these remaining issues: 
1. Was the prospective effect doctrine properly invoked by the ExxonMobil 
Court even though the ExxonMobil decision did not announce a new rule of law but 
merely clarified the meaning of existing law? 
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Standard of review: "Although we are normally bound by our own precedent, we 
may overrule it where 'the decision is clearly erroneous or conditions have changed so as 
to render the prior decision inapplicable.'" Munson v. Chamberlain, 2007 UT 91, f^ 20, 
173 P.3d 848, quoting State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 399 n. 3 (Utah 1994). 
2. Should the ExxonMobil Court reverse its prospective effect limitation 
inasmuch as the policy considerations upon which the Court relied were based on factual 
errors regarding the potential fiscal impact of the retroactive application of ExxonMobil! 
Standard of review: "Although we are normally bound by our own precedent, we 
may overrule it where 'the decision is clearly erroneous or conditions have changed so as 
to render the prior decision inapplicable.'" Id. 
3. Did the ExxonMobil Court exceed its constitutional authority and usurp the 
legislative function when it deprived taxpayers other than ExxonMobil of the right to rely 
on the Court's correct interpretation of severance tax laws thereby ensuring that the 
Commission would continue to enforce it misinterpretation of such laws despite the 
Court's finding that "[t]he Tax Commission's position regarding the statutory meaning is 
incorrect"? ExxonMobil, ^ 20. 
Standard of review: "Although we are normally bound by our own precedent, we 
may overrule it where 'the decision is clearly erroneous or conditions have changed so as 
to render the prior decision inapplicable.'" Munson, 2007 UT 91, f 20. 
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DETERMINATIVE LAW 
The primary issue in this matter will be determined by this Court's interpretation 
of its own prior decision in ExxonMobil Corp, v. Utah State Tax Comm 'n, 2003 UT 53, 
86 P.3d 706. The specific language from that case, which Petitioners believe the 
Commission erroneously interpreted, is as follows: 
We recognize, however, that preventing the retroactive application of the 
rule to ExxonMobil, which has expended considerable time and resources 
to attack the actions of the Tax Commission, would both deprive 
ExxonMobil of the fruits of victory and 'potentially]. . . discourage[e] 
other litigants from challenging [actions] of questionable validity.' 
Id., TI 23 (citations omitted). 
Thus, whether in refund requests or deficiency proceedings, as to all but 
ExxonMobil the rule announced today is to have prospective application 
only. 
Id., Tf 23 (emphasis added). 
Although ExxonMobil is entitled to further adjudication of its claim for a 
refund, as to other parties who may have refund requests, deficiency 
proceedings, or similar matters pending before the Tax Commission, our 
holding is to apply prospectively only. 
Id., \ 24 (emphasis added). 
The issues presented in the alternative do not depend on this Court's interpretation 
of Constitutional, statutory, or administrative law. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal of an administrative proceeding before the Commission 
concerning statutory notices issued to ExxonMobil and MEPNA by the Auditing Division 
of the Utah State Tax Commission (the "Division") which denied the Petitioners' requests 
for severance tax refunds. 
B. Course of Proceedings 
On November 25, 2003, the Utah Supreme Court issued the ExxonMobil decision 
in which it provided an interpretation of portions of Utah statutory provisions on 
severance tax. The ExxonMobil Court held that "as to all but ExxonMobil the rule 
announced today is to have prospective application only." ExxonMobil, % 23. 
After the ExxonMobil decision was issued, MEPNA filed amended severance tax 
returns for tax years 1999 and 2000 and ExxonMobil filed amended severance tax returns 
for 1998 through 2003. The Division granted MEPNA's refund request for 1999 and 
denied all remaining refund requests insofar as those requests were based on deductions 
of transportation costs as permitted under the ExxonMobil decision. Appeal No. 06-0915 
R. 1; Appeal No. 06-1218 R. 193; Appeal No. 07-1118 R. 177; Appeal No. 07-1124 
R. 176.1 
because these appeals were informally consolidated for purposes of discovery and 
Petitioners' Motion for Summary Judgment, substantially identical pleadings are 
contained in the record for each of the four appeals. In the interest of clarity and brevity, 
Petitioners5 citations to the record will be to those documents contained in Appeal No. 
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ExxonMobil and MEPNA filed timely appeals from the statutory notices denying 
Petitioners' refund requests. Id. On February 26, 2008, Petitioners filed a Motion for 
Summary Judgment by which they claimed that the ExxonMobil decision should be 
retroactively applied to their refund requests. R. 71. A hearing on the Motion was held 
on June 17, 2008. R. 510. On November 17, 2008, the Commission issued its Order 
Denying Petitioners' Motion for Summary Judgment. R. 509.2 Petitioners filed their 
Petition for Review on December 10, 2008. R. 533. 
C. Commission's Disposition of the Administrative Proceeding 
In its Order the Commission found that there were no factual disputes which 
precluded summary judgment, R. 515-516, and held "that ExxonMobil is not entitled to 
the retroactive application of the Court's decision in ExxonMobil Corporation to the 
refund requests at issue in these appeals that are now before the Commission." R, 520. 
The Commission's denial of Petitioner's motion was based on its decision to 
narrowly interpret the ExxonMobil Court's decision to grant limited retroactive relief. 
The Commission held that, notwithstanding the Court's refusal to "prevent[] the 
retroactive application of the rule to ExxonMobil," the ExxonMobil Court's "policy 
considerations [were] best met by interpreting the Court's retroactive application 
06-0915, except where it is necessary to cite to pleadings or documents that are unique to 
one of the four appeals in which case the appeal number will be identified with the 
appropriate record cite. 
2The Order of the Commission will be referred to herein as the "Order" and is 
found at Addendum 1, and comprises R. 509 through 526. 
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narrowly to only include the 'refund request' that was before the court in ExxonMobil 
Corporation." R. 518. 
Although the Commission acknowledged that "the Court's statement that 'as to all 
but ExxonMobil the rule announced today is to have prospective application only'. . . 
could, in isolation, be interpreted to allow other claims by ExxonMobil," the Commission 
held that the Court's granting of limited retroactive relief was "limited to the specific 
claim for a refund before the Court during that proceeding," R. 519. 
Commissioner Dixon dissented from the Commission's Order concluding that 
Petitioners were entitled to retroactive application of the ExxonMobil decision. She 
observed: 
The Court could have specifically limited ExxonMobil to the years before it 
as it did in Rio Algom. The Court did not; thus, there is nothing in the 
ExxonMobil decision to indicate relief for the Petitioner is limited to the 
years that were before the Court. 
R. 522. 
Because the only issue raised by Petitioners' Requests for Agency Action was the 
retroactive application of ExxonMobil to their refund requests, the Commission's decision 
fully resolved the Petitioners' appeals. R. 515-516; 520. 
ExxonMobil and MEPNA filed their Petition for Review on December 10, 2008. 
R. 533. 
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D. Statement of Relevant Facts 
1. ExxonMobil was formed on November 30, 1999 as a result of a merger 
between Mobil Corporation and a wholly-owned subsidiary of Exxon Corporation. Order, 
p. 3 (R. 511) at HI. 
2. Prior to the merger, MEPNA was a wholly owned subsidiary of Mobil 
Corporation. As a result of the merger, MEPNA became a second-tier, wholly-owned 
subsidiary of ExxonMobil. Id. at^|2. 
3. MEPNA still exists today as a separate legal entity. Id. at \ 3. 
4. During the 1990fs MEPNA owned and operated oil and gas producing wells 
within the Greater Aneth Field in Southern Utah. Those wells were located in the 
McElmo Creek Unit and the Ratherford Unit. Id. at ^ 4. 
5. Prior to the merger, MEPNA owned 39.956% of the production from the 
McElmo Creek Unit. Exxon Corporation owned 24.787% and the remainder of the 
production was owned by Texaco and The Bureau of Indian Affairs. Id. at f^ 5. 
6. Prior to the merger, MEPNA owned 64.367% of the production from the 
Ratherford Unit. Exxon Corporation did not own any production from that field. Id. at 
16. 
7. From 1993 through 1998, MEPNA filed returns and paid severance taxes on 
its production of oil and gas from the Greater Aneth Field by calculating the value of oil 
on the price that was paid at the point of sale. Order, pp. 3-4 (R. 511) at ^ 17. 
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8. In 1999, after the merger, ExxonMobil filed amended severance tax returns, 
amending the original returns filed by MEPNA for the 1993 through 1998 tax years. The 
amended severance tax returns were based on the value of the oil produced using the net-
back method, which resulted in lower tax amounts than MEPNA had claimed on the 
original severance tax returns for each of the years. Order, p. 4 (R. 512) at Tf 8. 
9. After the Division denied ExxonMobil's requests for refunds for the 1993 
through 1998 tax years, ExxonMobil appealed to the Commission. The Commission 
upheld the Division's denial of the requests for refunds. Id, at ^ j 9-10. 
10. ExxonMobil appealed the Commission's decision to the Utah Supreme 
Court. Id atf 11. 
1L Because MEPNA was a wholly owned subsidiary of ExxonMobil, all 
litigation surrounding the refund requests was managed and financed by ExxonMobil. Id. 
atTf 12. 
12. On November 25, 2003, the Utah Supreme Court issued its decision in that 
appeal, providing an interpretation of portions of the severance tax provisions. Order, 
p. 4 (R. 512) at 1| 13. 
13. The Court declined to give full retroactive effect to its interpretation in light 
of revenue concerns raised by the Commission and certain amici. ExxonMobil, ^ 23. 
However, the Court stated that "whether in refund requests or deficiency proceedings, as 
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to all but ExxonMobil the rule announced today is to have prospective application only." 
Id. (emphasis added). 
14. The ExxonMobil Court remanded the matter to the Commission to calculate 
severance taxes in accordance with the interpretation provided by the Court, and, on 
November 21, 2005, the Commission directed the Division to issue a severance tax 
refund to ExxonMobil in the amount of $2,168,334.87 plus statutory interest. Order, 
pp. 4-5 (R. 512-513) at 1ffl 13-14. 
15. After the Commission determined that ExxonMobil was entitled to a re fund 
for MEPNA's overpayment of severance taxes for tax years 1993 through 1998, MEPNA 
filed amended severance tax returns for tax years 1999 and 2000, Order, p. 6 (R. 514) at 
fflf 20 and 22, and ExxonMobil filed amended severance tax returns for 1998 through 
2003. Order, p. 5 (R. 513) at fflf 17-18, R. 514 at % 24, R. 515 at If 26. 
16. ExxonMobil's amended returns for 1998 and 1999 included deductions of 
transportation costs to which Petitioners believed they were entitled under the 
ExxonMobil decision in addition to corrected calculations based on oil stripper 
exemptions, workover and recompletion credits. Order, p. 5 (R. 513) at |^ 17. 
17. All corrections made by ExxonMobil in its amended returns for 2000 to 
2003 and by MEPNA in its amended returns for 1999 and 2000 were fully attributable to 
deductions of transportation costs to which Petitioners believed they were entitled under 
the ExxonMobil decision. Order, p. 6 (R. 514) at ^ 20, R. 515 at lj 26; Appeal No. 07-
9 
1124 (ExxonMobil), R. 188 and R. 180 at If 12 - R. 181 at 1f 17; Appeal No. 07-1118 
(Mobil), R. 186 and R. 179 at ^ 8 - R. 180 at ^ 14. 
18. The Division approved the portions of ExxonMobil's 1998 and 1999 refund 
requests which were based on oil stripper exemptions and workover and recompletion 
credits. The adjustments based on deductions of transportation costs were denied. 
Appeal No. 06-0915 (ExxonMobil 1998) R. 10; Appeal No. 06-1218 (ExxonMobil 1999) 
R. 202. 
19. The Division granted MEPNA's 1999 refund request for the entire alleged 
overpayment amount of $285,842, plus applicable interest. That refund claim was fully 
attributable to deductions of transportation costs to which MEPNA believed it was 
entitled under ExxonMobil Order, p. 6 (R. 514) at fflf 17-18. 
20. The Division denied MEPNA's refund request for 2000, R. 514 at f 22, and 
ExxonMobil's refund requests for 2000 through 2003. Order, pp. 6-7 (R. 514-515) at 
ffif 24 and 27. 
21. ExxonMobil and MEPNA filed timely appeals from those denials whereby 
they asked the Commission to rule that Petitioners were entitled to retroactive application 
of the ExxonMobil decision and thus entitled to all remaining refund requests under the 
correct interpretation of severance tax laws. Id. 
22. The Commission denied Petitioners' refund requests, stating that 
"ExxonMobil is not entitled to the retroactive application of the Court's decision in 
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ExxonMobil Corporation to the refund requests at issue in these appeals that are now 
before the Commission." Order, p. 12 (R. 520). 
SUMMARY 
The Commission's legal interpretation of the ExxonMobil decision is reversible 
error because it disregarded the plain language by which the Court conclusively 
established the limitations on the application of the ExxonMobil decision. The 
Commission also ignored well-established principles of interpreting tax law in favor of 
the taxpayer when it narrowed the scope of retroactive application in furtherance of 
questionable "policy considerations." 
If this Court concludes that the Commission correctly interpreted the prospective 
relief limitation when it denied the Petitioners' refund requests, then Petitioners would 
urge this Court to reverse its decision to give only prospective application to its statutory 
interpretation in ExxonMobil Under Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106-107 
(1971), a prospective effect limitation is only appropriate when the decision which will 
not be applied retroactively has established "a new principle of law." The ExxonMobil 
decision did not establish "a new principle of law" because the interpretation of a statute 
merely "states the true nature of the law both retrospectively and prospectively." Malan 
v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661, 676 (Utah 1984). The prospective effect limitation is also 
reversible error inasmuch as the revenue concerns cited by the Court in support of its 
decision have proven to be unfounded. Munson v. Chamberlain, 2007 UT 91. The 
11 
ExxonMobil Court's decision to give only prospective effect to a matter of statutory 
interpretation created precedent with unforeseen ramifications based on a last minute 
argument about an issue which "did not benefit from the focus and refinement afforded 
issues actually litigated in the lower courts." Id., f^ 21. The suggestion that a court's 
correction of an agency's misinterpretation of a statute creates "new law" which cannot 
be retroactively applied deprives taxpayers of their statutory right to obtain refunds to 
which they would be entitled under the correct interpretation of the statute. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE COMMISSION ERRED WHEN IT IGNORED THIS COURT'S 
PLAIN LANGUAGE WHICH PERMITTED RETROACTIVE 
APPLICATION OF THE EXXONMOBIL DECISION TO EXXONMOBIL. 
The scope of a limitation on the application of a court's decision is established by 
the plain language used by the court imposing that limitation. Kennecott Corp. v. Utah 
State Tax Comm % 862 P.2d 1348 (Utah 1993); see also In re Twin Parks Ltd. 
Partnership, 720 F.2d 1374, 1376 (4th Cir. 1983)(uUltimately, the prospective or 
retroactive effects of a new rule depend upon the enunciating court's intention."). When 
this Court issued the ExxonMobil decision, interpreting Utah law to require valuation of 
oil and gas "in the immediate vicinity of the well, with the oil and gas remaining in a 
relatively natural state," ExxonMobil, \ 24, it gave limited retroactive effect to its 
decision, stating: 
12 
Thus, whether in refund requests or deficiency proceedings, as to all but 
ExxonMobil the rule announced today is to have prospective application 
only. 
ExxonMobil, ^ 23 (emphasis added). In its review of that decision, the Commission 
claims that the only retroactive relief approved by the Court was for the refund request at 
issue in that appeal3 
There are several options available to a court when circumstances permit a court to 
impose a limitation on the application of its decision.4 Those options include: 
(1) complete retroactivity; (2) limited retroactivity "to all parties on direct appeal"; 
(3) application "only to the case in which the new principle is announced and to those 
cases initiated in the future"; or (4) pure prospectivity. In re Twin Parks Ltd Partnership, 
720 F.2d at 1376. A court may also give "retroactive effect as to . . . others who have 
litigation pending." Rio Algom Corp. v. San Juan County, 681 P.2d 184, 196 (Utah 
1984). 
Neither the Commission nor the Petitioners have suggested that the language used 
by the ExxonMobil Court supports a finding of "complete retroactivity" or "pure 
prospectivity." Thus, the issue in this appeal is whether the language used by the 
3The ExxonMobil appeal began as six separate refund requests for 1993 through 
1998. Those individual appeals were ultimately consolidated into a single proceeding. 
Order, ffif 9-10 (R. 512). 
Petitioners believe that the prospective relief limitation announced in ExxonMobil 
was reversible error because the decision did not announce a new rule of law, but simply 
provided the correct interpretation of a statute. That position is discussed below in 
Section II. 
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ExxonMobil Court granted "limited retroactivity to all parties on direct appeal," as argued 
by Petitioners, or "only to the case in which the new principle is announced and to those 
cases initiated in the future," as the Commission contends. Id. If the Court granted 
"limited retroactivity to all parties on direct appeal," then the Court's interpretation of the 
valuation statute should be applied retroactively for all claims by ExxonMobil and its 
wholly-owned subsidiaries so long as those claims are not barred by the statute of 
limitations. 
A. The Plain Language Used By The ExxonMobil Court Supports The 
Conclusion That The Decision Is To Be Retroactively Applied To 
Petitioners9 Refund Requests. 
The plain language used by the ExxonMobil Court to define the scope of 
retroactivity is the best indicator of whether the Court intended to give ExxonMobil the 
benefit of the retroactive application of its decision. Kennecott, 862 P.2d at 1350. 
Although the ExxonMobil Court was persuaded b> amici parties to restrict the application 
of its decision, the Court specifically held that the prospective effect limitation would not 
apply to ExxonMobil: 
[Preventing the retroactive application of the rule to ExxonMobil, which 
has expended considerable time and resources to attack the actions of the 
Tax Commission, would both deprive ExxonMobil of the fruits of victory 
and 'potential[ly] . . . discouragefe] other litigants from challenging 
[actions] of questionable validity.' 
ExxonMobil, f^ 23. In defining the extent to which ExxonMobil was entitled to the 
retroactive application of the decision announced by the Court, the ExxonMobil Court did 
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not use any language which would suggest that its declaration of retroactivity for 
ExxonMobil was limited to only the matter under review: 
Thus, whether in refund requests or deficiency proceedings, as to all but 
ExxonMobil the rule announced today is to have prospective application 
only. 
Id (emphasis added). Finally, at the close of the decision, the Court once again explained 
that the parties which would not receive the benefit of the retroactive application of the 
ExxonMobil decision, were parties "other" than ExxonMobil. 
Although ExxonMobil is entitled to further adjudication of its claim for a 
refund, as to other parties who may have refund requests, deficiency 
proceedings, or similar matters pending before the Tax Commission, our 
holding is to apply prospectively only. 
ExxonMobil, % 24 (emphasis added).5 
5This interpretation of the plain language of the provisions governing retroactive 
application to ExxonMobil is consistent with how the Division initially interpreted the 
limitations on retroactivity. Inge-Lise Goss, the tax manager identified by the Division as 
its primary witness, explained that the Division approved MEPNA's 1999 refund request 
because it believed that additional refund actions were authorized under ExxonMobil: 
Q: And for those that you did allow [a refund] to, which was the 
MEPNA entity - You understand when I say "MEPNA" it's the 
acronym for Mobil Exploration and Producing? 
A: Um-hum. 
Q: For MEPNA you did allow it for the 1999 year because you viewed 
that they were the entity that the Supreme Court said should get 
retroactive relief 
A: Yes, they were that same entity, and it was the methodology that the 
Commissioners had determined. 
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In Kennecott, the taxpayer claimed that the Rio Algom Court had not reached the 
issue of whether litigants with pending claims could benefit from the Court's ruling. The 
Court denied the taxpayer's request for retroactive application of its decision in Rio 
Algom because "the opinion's plain language dictates that it apply only to those litigants 
and only for 1981, the tax year for which the suit in Rio Algom was brought." Kennecott 
Corp., 862 P.2d at 1350 (emphasis added). The Court observed that the Rio Algom Court 
had discussed alternative approaches to the prospective effect limitation, stating: 
[S]ome decisions that give only prospective effect to a holding of 
unconstitutionality as to all other parties, give the holding retroactive effect 
as to the litigants or others who have litigation pending. 
Id quoting Rio Algom, 681 P.2d at 196. The Kennecott Court held that the foregoing 
language showed that the Court was "cognizant of the various available options for 
applying [its] holding in Rio Algom and specifically rejected its application to 'others who 
[had] litigation pending.'" Id. 
The Commission, in ruling that the ExxonMobil Court did not intend to permit 
additional refund actions by Petitioners, ignored the fact that this Court was aware of its 
available options when it decided to permit limited retroactive relief This fact is 
evidenced by the Rio Algom Court's reference to multiple cases in which the plaintiffs 
were not bound by the prospective relief limitations even in cases which had not yet been 
filed. Stricklandv. Newton County, 244 Ga. 54, 258 S.E.2d 132 (1979)(plaintiffcounties 
R. 223 at p. 88:6-16. 
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"entitled to the fruits of the holding"); Kansas City Millwright Co. v. Kalb, 221 Kan. 658, 
562 P.2d 65 (1977)(retroactive relief for parties, taxpayers who paid taxes under protest, 
and taxpayers with pending litigation); and Perkins v. County of Albemarle, 214 Va. 416, 
419, 200 S.E.2d 566, 569 (1973)(class of taxpayers entitled to retroactive application of 
decision). 
In Perkins the petitioning taxpayers had prevailed in their class action against 
Albemarle County requesting declaratory relief regarding the constitutionality of the 
county's assessment methodology. On petition for rehearing, the court stated that it had 
given prospective effect to its decision except as to "taxpayers upon whom Albemarle 
County levied such unlawful taxes, including the plaintiffs and intervenors." Id As for 
those taxpayers, the court stated that they "could pursue their remedies as the statutes 
provide." Id It is clear from this statement that the parties excluded from the prospective 
relief limitation were being permitted to file future proceedings to obtain refunds of 
unlawfully collected taxes. The ExxonMobil Court's awareness of this available option 
supports ExxonMobil's interpretation of the prospective relief limitation. 
Subsequent to Rio Algom, the Utah Supreme Court held a taxing statute 
unconstitutional, but gave retroactive application to the plaintiff "to the year in which V-1 
alleges it began to pay the surcharge, subject only to any applicable statutes of limitations 
and to the extent that V-1 can demonstrate that it paid the surcharge on motor fuels." V-1 
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Oil Co, v. Utah State Tax Comm 'n, 942 P.2d 906, 915 (Utah 1996)6, vacated by V-l Oil 
Co. v. Utah State Tax Comm % 942 P.2d 906 (Utah 1997).7 The Court's decision to 
permit retroactive relief for all years not barred by the statute of limitations once again 
demonstrates the ExxonMobil Court's awareness of its various available options, 
including the option to give full retroactive effect to the plaintiff in the case before it. 
Because the plain language used by the Court authorizes complete retroactive application 
for ExxonMobil, it was not appropriate for the Commission to infer limitations which 
were not expressed by the Court. 
L There is no language in the ExxonMobil decision which limits the 
application of the case to only the matter before the ExxonMobil 
Court 
The Commission conceded that "the Court's statement that 'as to all but 
ExxonMobil the rule announced today is to have prospective application only' could, in 
6The Commission relied on V-l to support its denial of the relief requested by 
ExxonMobil, suggesting that the specificity with which the V-l Oil Court defined the 
scope of relief available to V-l meant that the ExxonMobil Court needed to be equally 
specific by stating that the retroactive relief was meant to extend to all years not barred by 
applicable limitations periods, otherwise such relief was not available. Order, pp. 11-12. 
The Commission erred when it inferred such a requirement, particularly inasmuch as the 
Court very specifically declared, without limitation, that "as to all but ExxonMobil the 
rule announced today is to have prospective application only." ExxonMobil, J^ 23. 
7The Court vacated the prior judgment because, on rehearing, it determined that the 
statute it had held unconstitutional did not impose a tax, but a fee and therefore was not 
subject to the same scrutiny which is applicable to a taxing statute. Although the Court's 
decision was reversed, it is nonetheless instructive to consider how the Court fashioned 
the prospective relief limitation in connection with its determination that the statute was 
unconstitutional. 
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isolation, be interpreted to allow other claims by ExxonMobil" Order, p. 11 (R. 519) 
(emphasis added). Despite its acknowledgment that the ExxonMobil decision permits 
such an interpretation, the Commission inexplicably concluded that "it is clear [that]. . . 
the retroactive application granted was limited to the specific claim for refund before the 
Court during that proceeding." Order, p. 10 (R. 518). The Commission's conclusion that 
the language permitting additional claims should be disregarded is based entirely on the 
following statement by the ExxonMobil Court: 
Although ExxonMobil is entitled to further adjudication of its claim for a 
refund, as to other parties who may have refund requests, deficiency 
proceedings, or similar matters pending before the Tax Commission, our 
holding is to apply prospectively only. 
ExxonMobil^ H 24 (emphasis added). According to the Commission, "The Court's 
reference to 'further adjudication of its claim for a refund' indicates the retroactive relief 
was limited to the refund claim that was before it in that proceeding." Order, p. 11 
(R. 519).8 
Such a limitation cannot be inferred from the Court's directive that the "claim for a 
refund" needed to be remanded for "further adjudication." The recognition that 
8The Commission acknowledged in its Order that the ExxonMobil appeal 
concerned multiple "requests for redetermination" where were "combined for the periods 
from 1993 through 1998 into one appeal." R. 512 at ffif 9-10 (emphasis added). 
Nevertheless, in a footnote to the same Order, the Commission inexplicably accused 
Petitioners of "misleading" the Commission by "characteriz[ing] the Supreme Court's 
decision to be one that, according to Petitioner, 'granted ExxonMobil's requests for 
severance tax refunds.'" R. 519, n. 4 (emphasis in original). Not only was ExxonMobil 
correct in stating that the case involved multiple refund requests, but whether there was 
one request or multiple requests is really immaterial to the determination of retroactivity. 
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ExxonMobil is entitled to "further adjudication" of its refund requests in no way 
constitutes a limitation on the availability of retroactive relief for claims which had not 
yet been filed by Petitioners. It is simply a mandate that the refund action before the 
Court required further attention from the Commission to determine the correct amount of 
severance tax. The order of remand for the refund requests pending before the Court at 
that time should not be interpreted to preclude additional claims by ExxonMobil. 
Furthermore, the words immediately following that directive make it abundantly 
clear that ExxonMobil has been entirely excluded from the limitation precluding 
retroactive relief. Having just referred to ExxonMobil, the Court states "as to other 
parties who may have refund requests, deficiency proceedings, or similar matters pending 
before the Tax Commission, our holding is to apply prospectively only." ExxonMobil, 
*f 24 (emphasis added). The use of the phrase "other parties" to describe those to whom 
the "holding is to apply prospectively only" can only be interpreted to mean that parties 
"other" than ExxonMobil are subject to the prospective relief limitation and ExxonMobil 
is not. 
2. The application of ExxonMobil to additional claims did not 
depend on whether the ExxonMobil Court anticipated, 
mentioned, or acknowledged such potential claims. 
The Commission also attempted to support its narrow interpretation of the Court's 
plain language by suggesting that "If the Court had intended a broader application of the 
selective retroactive relief it would have been specific on that point." Order, p. 11 
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(R. 519). It observed that "there is no mention, or acknowledgment in the Court's 
decision that ExxonMobil might subsequently file additional refund requests for later 
periods or different subsidiaries than the 'request for a refund' before the Court in that 
proceeding." Order, p. 9 (R. 517). The Commission claimed that Petitioners' 
interpretation was not "well-supported" because "that interpretation greatly extends the 
Court's limited retroactive application to refund requests unknown to the Court at the 
time of the decision." Id, p. 10 (R. 518). 
It was not necessary for this Court to speculate on what claims ExxonMobil might 
make at some future time. A prospective relief limitation, by its very nature, will permit 
application of a court's decision to some claims and preclude application of the law to 
other claims. There is no legal basis for the Commission's suggestion that the only claims 
to which a decision may apply are those claims which are specifically anticipated or 
identified by the court imposing the limitation.9 Clearly the prospective application of the 
ExxonMobil decision will be to claims unknown at the time the Court issued the decision. 
The fact that the retroactive application authorized for ExxonMobil will also be to claims 
9Although the Rio Algom Court referred to specific claims to which the retroactive 
relief would apply, the specificity was necessary to limit the application of the decision to 
"the year at issue in this case." Rio Algom, 681 P.2d at 196. In the absence of that 
language, the decision would have been retroactive for all potential claims by the 
taxpayer-plaintiffs which were not barred by the statute of limitations. The ExxonMobil 
Court did not include a reference to the potential claims to which the decision could be 
applied because it was not imposing a similar limitation. Thus, the only limitation on 
claims raised by ExxonMobil is the statutory limitations period. 
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unknown at the time of the decision does not mean that Petitioners are not entitled to the 
relief specifically granted by the ExxonMobil Court. 
It is sufficient that the Court held that "as to all but ExxonMobil the rule 
announced today is to have prospective application only." ExxonMobil, j^ 23 (emphasis 
added). The fact that ExxonMobil was specifically excluded from the group to which the 
prospective effect limitation applies, means, in no uncertain terms, that ExxonMobil is 
entitled to the retroactive application of ExxonMobil so long as any claims it brings are 
within the statutory limitations period. In fact, until January 18, 2008, the Division 
believed that the ExxonMobil decision did not preclude additional claims and approved 
MEPNA's 1999 refund request based on that understanding: 
Q: For MEPNA you did allow [a refiind] for the 1999 year because you 
viewed that they were the entity that the Supreme Court said should 
get retroactive relief. 
A: Yes, they were that same entity, and it was the methodology that the 
Commissioners had determined. 
R. 223 at p. 88:11-16. 
The Rio Algom Court decided that the retroactive application of the decision would 
be limited to "the year for which [the] suit for refund was brought." Rio Algom, 681 P.2d 
at 196. The ExxonMobil Court did not impose a similar limitation. The fact that the 
ExxonMobil Court could have, but did not use similar limiting language in fashioning the 
relief available to ExxonMobil, compels the conclusion that the Court did not intend to 
limit the retroactive relief to only the "year[s] for which this suit for refund was brought." 
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Id Contrary to the Commission's claim, ExxonMobil is not asking this Court to "greatly 
extend[] the Court's limited retroactive application," Order, p. 10 (R. 518), rather it is 
asking this Court to give effect to the plain language of its pronouncement and reverse the 
restrictions imposed by the Commission. Just as the Kennecott Court was "cognizant of 
the various available options for applying [its] holding in Rio Algom" Kennecott, 862 
P.2d at 1350, the ExxonMobil Court was likewise aware of its options at the time it issued 
the ExxonMobil decision. Fully aware of those options, the Court "specifically rejected 
its application to 'others who [had] litigation pending,'" yet carved out a specific, 
unlimited exception for ExxonMobil, stating, "Thus, whether in refund requests or 
deficiency proceedings, as to all but ExxonMobil the rule announced today is to have 
prospective application only." ExxonMobil, ^ 23 (emphasis added). The only reasonable 
conclusion which can be drawn from the Court's plain language is that ExxonMobil is 
entitled to the retroactive application of the ExxonMobil decision for all refund requests 
which are not barred by the applicable statute of limitations. 
B. The Commission Erred In Deciding To Further The ExxonMobil 
Court's Policy Considerations "By Interpreting The Court's 
Retroactive Application Narrowly." 
Because the plain language governing retroactive application to ExxonMobil does 
not specifically preclude ExxonMobil from relying on the ExxonMobil decision in other 
requests for refunds, the Commission inferred a restriction based on the fact that the 
Court's "express language" demonstrated its intention "to limit the refunds that would 
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otherwise result from its decision because of the financial impact to governmental 
entities." Order, p. 9 (R. 517). According to the Commission "the Court likely intended 
to broadly protect the small governmental entities from other refund requests not before 
it." Id.9 p. 10 (R. 518). Therefore, the Commission held that the ExxonMobil Court's 
"policy considerations [are] best met by interpreting the Court's retroactive application 
narrowly to only include the 'refund request' before the court in ExxonMobil 
Corporation." Id. The Commission's decision to narrowly interpret the language 
granting retroactive relief to ExxonMobil is reversible error for three reasons: First, the 
ExxonMobil Court had already weighed the interest of ExxonMobil in retroactive 
application of the decision against the Court's concerns for "small governmental entities." 
Second, the Commission's decision to narrowly interpret the Court's language ignores the 
long-standing principle of liberal interpretation of governing law in favor of the taxpayer. 
Third, the Commission should not have given any weight to policy considerations which 
the Commission knew were based on mistakes of fact. 
1. The ExxonMobil Court had already weighed the fiscal concerns 
against ExxonMobil's right to retroactive relief. 
The Commission's reliance on the Court's revenue concerns as justification for its 
narrow interpretation of the ExxonMobil decision ignores the fact that, when the Court 
decided that ExxonMobil was entitled to retroactive application of its decision, it had 
already balanced its revenue concerns against ExxonMobil's right to relief. It recognized 
that ExxonMobil had "expended considerable time and resources to attack the actions of 
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the Tax Commission." In view of these significant expenditures, the Court refused to 
"deprive ExxonMobil of the fruits of victory and 'potentially].. . discourage[e] other 
litigants from challenging [actions] of questionable validity." ExxonMobil, % 23. This 
was the same analysis undertaken by this Court in V-l Oil wherein the Court ruled the 
challenged statute was unconstitutional, but held that V-l Oil was entitled to retroactive 
application of its decision, not only for the years specifically addressed by the complaint, 
but for all years during which it had been paying the unconstitutional tax: 
Prospective application of our decision to V-l, the only party to this appeal, 
would have the potential of discouraging other litigants from challenging 
statutes of questionable validity. Rio Algom, 681 P.2d at 196. Indeed, we 
have said in the past that it would be unconscionable to deprive the litigant 
who has sustained the burden of attacking an unconstitutional statute of the 
fruits of victory. Therefore as to V-l our decision is retroactive to the year 
in which V-l alleges it began to pay the surcharge, subject only to any 
applicable statutes of limitations and to the extent that V-l can demonstrate 
that it paid the surcharge on motor fuels. See Rio Algom, 681 P.2d at 196. 
V-l Oil Co,, 942 P.2d at 915 (citations omitted). 
Like the V-l Oil Court, the ExxonMobil Court also felt that the interest of the 
litigant who "expended considerable time and resources to attack the actions of the Tax 
Commission" outweighed the policy considerations on which the prospective effect 
limitation was based. ExxonMobil, H 23. In both cases this Court did not restrict the 
plaintiffs' right to retroactive application of the decision to claims which were not barred 
by applicable statutes of limitations. It was not the province of the Commission to further 
restrict that relief in the interest of articulated policy considerations already considered 
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and weighed by the ExxonMobil Court. Because this Court has already determined that 
ExxonMobil's right to relief outweighed the revenue concerns, the Commission erred 
when it held that the revenue concerns addressed by the ExxonMobil Court were "best 
met by interpreting the Court's retroactive application narrowly." Order, p. 10 (R. 518). 
2. The Commission's decision to narrowly interpret the retroactive 
relief available to ExxonMobil ignores long-standing policy of 
interpreting applicable law in favor of the taxpayer. 
The ExxonMobil Court recognized that, where statutory language is not plain, a 
court cannot ignore its "mandate that taxing statutes be construed in favor of the 
taxpayer." ExxonMobil, \ 14. If there is any ambiguity, then principles of statutory 
interpretation which favor the taxpayer should likewise be applied to the interpretation of 
case law. The Commission's decision to "narrow" the scope of retroactive relief to 
advance the ExxonMobil Court's policy considerations ignores the mandate to interpret 
applicable law "liberally in favor of the taxpayer." Id. at ^J19. Commissioner Dixon 
dissented from the Commission's Order, expressing her concern for the Commission's 
departure from interpretive principles which favor taxpayers as follows: 
In the end, I am most wary of the precedent the Majority opinion sets 
for subsequent taxpayers and entities seeking administrative remedy 
and relief based on a court decision. 
It is an often-cited principle to be cautious when interpreting tax 
statutes against taxpayers. As the Supreme Court wrote in County Board of 
Equalization of Wasatch County v. Utah State Tax Commission and 
Strawberry Water Users Association (Utah 1997): 
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It is an established rule in the construction of tax 
statutes that if any doubt exists as to the meaning of the 
statute, 'our practice is to construe taxation statutes liberally 
in favor of the taxpayer, leaving it to the legislature to clarify 
an intent to be more restrictive if such intent exists.' Salt 
Lake County v. State Tax Commission 779 P.2d 1131, 1132 
(Utah 1989). 
If there is any ambiguity in the reading and application of 
retroactivity and prospectivity as it relates to the Court's cases, I have 
applied that principle in favor of the taxpayer. 
Order, pp. 17-18 (R. 525-526) (emphasis in original). 
ExxonMobil does not believe that there is any ambiguity in the Court's ruling on 
prospectivity and that the Commission's decision to "interpret^ the Court's retroactive 
relief narrowly" is an abuse of its authority. Id, p. 10 (R. 518). However, if this Court 
believes that its declarations regarding ExxonMobil's right to retroactive application of 
the ExxonMobil decision were less than clear, then the standard of interpretation of a 
judicial opinion should be the same as the principles governing interpretations of a 
statute.10 The Commission's decision to "interpret^ the Court's retroactive application 
narrowly," impermissibly expands the scope of the ExxonMobil Court's prospective relief 
limitation. 
10ExxonMobil recognizes that this Court, as the author of the ExxonMobil decision, 
has the right to provide any interpretation it sees fit, and, if it so desires, may alter, amend, 
or overrule its own pronouncements. However, because the Commission is a subordinate 
adjudicatory body, ExxonMobil believes its interpretation should be guided by well-
established principles of interpretation. 
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3- The Commission should not have championed the ExxonMobil 
Court's policy considerations which the Commission knew were 
based on factual errors. 
The Commission's attempt to justify restricting the retroactive relief available to 
ExxonMobil in order to further the "policy considerations" of the ExxonMobil Court is 
especially troubling inasmuch as the Commission is fully aware that those "policy 
considerations" were based on mistakes of fact. In a recent appeal before this Court, to 
which the Commission was a party, Union Oil Company demonstrated that the 
prospective relief limitation was based on the misapprehension of certain facts. The 
Commission did not rebut those claims. For example, Union Oil Company demonstrated 
that, contrary to the ExxonMobil Court's suggestion, the wholesale application of the 
ExxonMobil decision would not have impacted "other small governmental entities" 
because, with the exception of the severance taxes allocated to the amici funds, all of the 
remaining taxes are remitted to the State's General Fund. Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-115 
(copy of statute provided at Addendum 3). Union Oil Co. v. Utah State Tax Comm 'n, 
Case No. 20080068-SC, Opening Brief of Petitioner, pp. 22-23 (filed May 27, 2008), 
portions of relevant pleading attached hereto at Addendum 4. In addition, the decision to 
limit application of the decision to protect the amici funds ignored the fact that the only 
time the amici funds would be impacted was when the wells were actually located on 
Indian lands. Id. at 20-22, and Utah Code Ann. §§ 59-5-116 and 119 (copies of statutes 
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provided at Addendum 3).u Whether the amici funds would have even been impacted by 
refund requests was questionable inasmuch as the refund given to ExxonMobil had been 
issued from the State's General Fund, rather than the amici funds. Unocal also pointed 
out that the prospective relief limitation resulted in a significant windfall to the amici and 
the General Fund because the ExxonMobil Court held that the correct interpretation of the 
statute would not apply to taxpayers who had paid their severance taxes correctly. 
The Commission was fully aware of these facts on or about May 27, 2008, when 
Unocal filed its Opening Brief, and did not rebut these facts in its Respondent's Brief 
filed July 21, 2008. Nevertheless, in its Order issued on November 17, 2008-nearly six 
months after the Opening Brief in the Unocal matter had been filed-the Commission used 
the Court's concern for the '"burden on the amici revitalization fluids and other relatively 
small governmental entities'" to justify its narrow interpretation of the scope of 
retroactive relief available to ExxonMobil. Order, p. 10 (R. 518), quoting ExxonMobil, 
^ 23. The furtherance of the Court's flawed "policy considerations" did not justify 
ignoring the Court's plain language which, by the Commission's own admission, could 
"be interpreted to allow other claims by ExxonMobil." Id, p. 11 (R. 519). The 
1
 Although the wells operated by MEPNA and ExxonMobil are on Indian lands, 
the fact remains that many oil and gas wells are not on Indian lands and that the 
ExxonMobil decision did not take this fact into account when it refused to make its 
interpretation of severance tax provisions applicable to all severance taxpayers. This 
error demonstrates that the issue of potential harm to trust fund lands and "other small 
governmental entities" "did not benefit from the focus and refinement afforded issues 
actually litigated in the lower courts." Munson v. Chamberlain, 2007 UT 91. 
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Commission's insistence that a "narrow interpretation" was essential to further policy 
considerations which the Commission knew were based on factual errors is insupportable. 
II. THIS COURT SHOULD OVERTURN THE PROSPECTIVE RELIEF 
LIMITATION ADOPTED IN EXXONMOBIL. 
If this Court concludes that the retroactive relief approved by the ExxonMobil 
Court did not extend to the claims at issue in this appeal, then Petitioners request that this 
Court reexamine and reverse the ExxonMobil prospective relief limitation. 
After this Court issued the ExxonMobil decision, the amicus oil and gas companies 
filed a Petition for Rehearing on the issue of prospectivity. Petitioners did not join in the 
petition because they understood the Court's decision to mean that Petitioners were 
entitled to the full retroactive application of the decision for the claim before the Court, in 
addition to any future refund claims which were not barred by the statute of limitations. 
Because Petitioners believed they would receive the retroactive application of the 
decision, they did not believe they had any interest in the Petition for Rehearing filed by 
the amicus parties.12 
The decision to adopt a prospective relief limitation in ExxonMobil ignored the 
requirement that "the decision to be applied nonretroactively must establish a new 
12At the time the petition was pending, an amendment to Rule 35 was also pending 
which would prohibit an amicus party from filing a petition for rehearing. Utah R. App. 
P., Rule 35(e). That amendment (which was adopted by April 1, 2004) was referred to by 
the Commission in its memorandum opposing rehearing on the basis that amicus parties 
did not have standing to request a rehearing. Because the Court denied the petition 
without explanation, it is not clear whether the petition was denied on its merits or for 
lack of standing. 
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principle of law, either by overruling clear past precedent on which litigants may have 
relied or by deciding an issue of first impression whose resolution was not clearly 
foreshadowed." Chevron Oil, 404 U.S. at 106-107. When this Court rejected the 
Commission's interpretation of the statute, it did not "establish new law," but merely 
"state[d] the true nature of the law both retrospectively and prospectively." Malan, 693 
P.2d at 676. 
The Court's decision to deny retroactive relief because the ExxonMobil decision 
resulted in "rules contrary to those relied on by the taxing authorities" ignores the fact that 
the Commission's misinterpretation of the severance tax provisions was not established 
law. Compare Loyal Order of Moose v. County Bd. of Equalization, 657 P.2d 257, 259 
(Utah 1982) (law upon which taxpayers had relied was the result of judicial decisions 
which spanned decades). The Court's decision to deny taxpayers the right to retroactive 
application of ExxonMobil because it conflicted with the Commission's erroneous 
interpretation of severance tax laws cannot be reconciled with the fact that an agency's 
interpretation of statute is given no deference by reviewing courts. Sullivan v. Utah Bd. 
of Oil Gas & Mining, 2008 UT 44, 189 P.3d 63 ^[9-10 ("We review an administrative 
agency's 'interpretation of its statutorily granted powers and authority as a question of 
law, with no deference to the agency's view of the law.'"). Under the precedent 
established by ExxonMobil, an agency's misinterpretation of law, once corrected, may 
now become binding law for the time period preceding the Court's clarification! 
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The Court also accepted at face value "[t]he revenue concerns cited by the Tax 
Commission and amici," even though "the full breadth and depth of the [alleged] impact 
[was] not immediately apparent from the record." ExxonMobil, j^ 23. In the wake of the 
ExxonMobil decision, as pertinent facts which contradict the Commission's and amici's 
representations have come to light, it is apparent that the Court's decision to limit the 
application of ExxonMobil "did not benefit from the focus and refinement afforded issues 
actually litigated in the lower courts." Munson, 2007 UT 91, j^ 21. The Court's 
unprecedented decision to apply a prospective relief limitation to a matter of statutory 
interpretation has led to substantial inequities which were not fully considered and were 
likely not foreseen by the ExxonMobil Court. 
A. The ExxonMobil Court Erred When It Imposed A Prospective Relief 
Limitation Because Interpretations of Statutes Do Not "Establish A 
New Principle Of Law," 
Until the issuance of the ExxonMobil decision, this Court had consistently applied 
the three-factor test announced in Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson to determine whether the 
prospective application of that decision was appropriate.13 The first Chevron Oil factor 
requires that "the decision to be applied nonretroactively must establish a new principle 
i3In Harper v. Virginia Department of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86 (1993), the Court 
overturned Chevron Oil and held that "[w]hen this Court applies a rule of federal law to 
the parties before it, that rule is the controlling interpretation of federal law and must be 
given full retroactive in all cases still open on direct review . . . ." Many state courts, 
including Utah's, have interpreted the Harper decision to apply specifically to issues of 
federal law and have continued to use the Chevron Oil test to determine whether a new 
principle of state law should be applied retroactively. 
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of law, either by overruling clear past precedent on which litigants may have relied or by 
deciding an issue of first impression whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed." 
Chevron Oil, 404 U.S. at 106-07 (emphasis added). If this element is not satisfied, there 
is no need to evaluate the remaining factors.14 
In all cases prior to ExxonMobil in which this Court gave prospective effect to its 
decision, this Court had created new law by either (1) striking down a tax statute as 
unconstitutional, V-l Oil, 942 P.2d 906 (determined statute violated state constitution); 
Timpanogos Planning and Water Management Agency v. Central Utah Water 
Conservancy DisL, 690 P.2d 562 (1984) (statute allowing district court to appoint board 
of directors of water conservancy districts held unconstitutional); Rio Algom Corp., 681 
P.2d 184 (taxing statute held unconstitutional); or (2) reversing itself with regard to a 
long-standing judicial interpretation of a statutory provision upon which litigants had 
justifiably relied. Loyal Order of Moose, 657 P.2d at 265 (Court gave prospective effect 
to its correction of "an interpretation of law that has been relied on [since 1911]."). The 
ExxonMobil decision represents an abrupt departure from well-established jurisprudence. 
The issue before the ExxonMobil Court concerned the interpretation of a severance 
tax statute. The statute was not ruled unconstitutional, nor did the Court's interpretation 
"overrule] clear past precedent on which litigants may have relied." Chevron Oil, 404 
14Those factors include "whether retrospective operation will further or retard [the 
new law's] operation" and whether "substantial inequitable results" will occur if the new 
law is applied retroactively. Chevron Oil, 404 U.S. at 106-07. 
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U.S. at 106. This Court has long recognized that, in matters of statutory interpretation, 
"the ruling of a court is deemed to state the true nature of the law both retrospectively and 
prospectively." Malan, 693 P.2d at 675. Thus, when a court answers "a specific question 
about the meaning of a statute, [its] initial interpretation does not announce a new rule of 
law." Fiore v. White, 562 Pa. 634, 644, 757 A.2d 842, 848 (2000).15 
In several recent cases, courts have held that interpretations of statutes do not 
"establish a new principle of law" as required by Chevron Oil, and have denied requests 
to make those interpretations prospective only. For example, in Clark v. State Farm Mut. 
Auto. Ins. Co., 319 F.3d 1234, 1242 (10th Cir. 2003), the insurer argued that a decision 
interpreting a Colorado statute ("Brennan") had announced a new rule of law and should 
not be applied to a subsequent case arising out of facts which had occurred prior to the 
issuance of that decision. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held that because the 
Brennan decision "involved the interpretation of a statute . . . [it] did not establish a new 
principle of law. Thus, it does not satisfy the first [Chevron Oil] factor and . . . Brennan 
must be applied retroactively." Id. 
15This fact explains why the distinction between creating new law, i.e. statutes 
which are found unconstitutional, versus interpretations of existing law is so important. 
A publicly elected Legislature enacts law as the representatives of the people. When a 
statute is deemed unconstitutional, it still represents the Legislature's intention regarding 
that law. Therefore, although prospective effect of an unconstitutional statute may seem 
unfair, the statute, nevertheless, represents the intended will of the elected Legislature. In 
contrast, when a statute is interpreted and a Court refuses to give retroactive effect to that 
interpretation, it is disregarding the intention and will of the Legislature, thus usurping the 
role of the Legislature. 
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In Broyles v. Ft. Lyon Canal Co., 695 P.2d 1136, 1144 (Colo. 1985), the plaintiff 
argued that a prior decision ("De Beque") should not be applied retroactively to facts 
which occurred prior to the issuance of the decision. The Colorado Supreme Court 
refused to limit the application of the prior decision, stating: 
In De Beque, however, we did not establish a new principle of law. Rather, 
we merely interpreted and applied a statute that was enacted prior to the 
time Broyles was required to file his application. Accordingly any 
contention that De Beque, or the filing requirement of section 37-92-301(4), 
is inapplicable to this case is erroneous. 
Id., at 1144 (emphasis added). 
In Sodexho Marriott Mgmt. v. United States, 61 Fed. CI. 229, 238 (Fed. CI. 2004 
the court held that a prior decision did not create new law and must be given full 
retroactive effect because it "merely interpreted and applied a statute," stating: 
Because Pacrim Pizza involved the interpretation of a statute enacted prior 
to the time the Contract was issued, it did not establish a new principle of 
law. See Clark v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 319 F.3d 1234, 1242 
(10th Cir. 2003) (applying the Chevron Oil factors, which the Colorado 
Supreme Court adopted as the retroactivity standards for civil cases, to 
determine whether or not to apply a relevant state decision retroactively). 
Thus, the first Chevron Oil factor would not be satisfied, and it would be 
proper to apply the interpretation of sections 1346(a)(2) and 1491(a)(1) 
contained in Pacrim Pizza retroactively. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
The ExxonMobil decision clearly concerned a matter of statutory interpretation. In 
stating the applicable standard of review, the Court indicated that it was "reviewing] the 
Tax Commission's interpretations of the various statutory provisions implicated in this 
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matter." ExxonMobil, % 10 (emphasis added). The Court concluded the statute in 
question was ambiguous and applied "the general principle that we 'construe taxation 
statutes liberally in favor of the taxpayer . . . ." Id., If 19. Applying that standard, the 
Court held "that valuation does not necessarily occur at the point of sale, wherever that 
may be, but rather in the immediate vicinity of the point at which the oil or gas is 
physically removed from the earth." Id. Because the ExxonMobil decision was purely a 
matter of statutory interpretation, this Court should have recognized that its ruling 
"state[d] the true nature of the law both retrospectively and prospectively," and allowed 
retroactive application without restriction. Malan, 693 P.2d at 675. 
The ExxonMobil decision also did not create new law by "deciding an issue of first 
impression whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed." Chevron Oil, 404 U.S. at 
106-107. Prior to the ExxonMobil decision, there were only two other cases which 
addressed the meaning of "at the well" and, in both cases, the decisions supported 
ExxonMobil's interpretation of the severance tax provisions. In Belnorth Petroleum 
Corp. v. State Tax Comm 'n, 845 P.2d 266, 276 (Utah Ct. App. 1993), the Utah Court of 
Appeals held that the term "at the well" indicated that "the legislature opted not to tax the 
[producer's] gross receipts." In Appeal No. 88-1676, p. 4, the Commission held that "the 
clear and literal meaning of. . . 'at the well' means the gross value of those products at 
Ihe point of their removal from the well." All available precedent supported 
ExxonMobil's interpretation of the severance tax provisions. 
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Further! nine, the Court resolved the issue of statutory interpretation by following 
its "mandate that taxing statutes be construed in favor of the taxpayer," ExxonMobil, \ 14, 
and by heeding the requirement that the Court "harmonizfe] the various definitions at play 
in the severance tax statute." Id. at f 20. The ExxonMobil Court's adherence to these 
well-established principles and the resulting statutory interpretation was foreseeable, and 
thus the Court's decision did not establish "new law," but merely provided the correct 
interpretation of existing law. Nevertheless, the ExxonMobil Court seems to have 
concluded that its decision created "new law" inasmuch as it characterized the decision as 
resulting in "rules contrary to those relied on by the taxing authorities." Id. at 123 
The Commission's denials of ExxonMobil's refund requests were based on its 
interpretation of the same severance tax provisions ultimately interpreted by the 
ExxonMobil Court. The fact that the Court struck down the Commission's interpretation 
does not mean that the Court created new laws "contrary to those relied on by the taxing 
authorities." Id. The fact that new law was not created is illustrated by the contrast 
between the ExxonMobil statutory interpretation issue and the Loyal Order of Moose case 
wherein the Court clearly identified a specific line of cases giving an expansive 
interpretation to the phrase "exclusive use." Loyal Order of Moose, 657 P.2d at 265-266. 
In contrast, there was no separate set of "rules relied on by the taxing authorities" in 
ExxonMobil. The only basis for the Commission's denial of the refund requests was its 
own misinterpretation of the statute. If the Chevron Oil standard of creating "new law" is 
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satisfied any time the Court reverses an agency's interpretation of a statute, then under 
ExxonMobil the agency will be able to enforce its misinterpretation for all time periods 
preceding the Court's clarification and the only aggrieved parties for whom relief will be 
available are the ones who win the race to the courthouse. 
The Court's decision that it has created "new law" when it corrects an agency's 
persistent misinterpretation of a statute, ignores the fact that this same Court has 
consistently recognized the right of a court to review an agency's interpretation of a 
statute without giving any deference to the agency's interpretation. Sullivan, 2008 UT 
f^ J 9-10 ("We review an administrative agency's 'interpretation of its statutorily granted 
powers and authority as a question of law, with no deference to the agency's view of the 
law.'"), accordBevans v. Industrial Comm'n, 790 P.2d 573, 576 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), 
Bennion v. Graham Resources, 849 P.2d 569, 570 (Utah 1993) ("[W]e review the Board's 
interpretation of the applicable statutes for correctness and give its view on the matter no 
particular deference."). If a court owes no deference to the agency's interpretation of a 
statute, then it should not empower that agency to enforce its misinterpretation once the 
court has provided the correct statutory interpretation. Yet that is exactly what happened 
in ExxonMobil. 
When the ExxonMobil Court refused to give retroactive effect to the correct 
interpretation of the statute, the Division not only denied refund requests based on the 
correct interpretation of the severance tax laws, but also began issuing deficiency 
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assessments by which it has sought to enforce its misinterpretation of the severance tax 
provisions for periods predating the ExxonMobil decision. Because the Court deprived 
taxpayers of the right to rely on the ExxonMobil decision, the Commission has 
successfully enforced its misinterpretation of the statute, giving it the weight of 
established law. Even though the agency's interpretation of the statute carries no weight 
when a court reviews that interpretation, the effect of the ExxonMobil decision has been 
to make the agency's misinterpretation the law in effect for the time periods predating the 
ExxonMobil decision. This result is inconsistent with the well-established standard of 
review and disregards the role of the legislature in creating law. 
The ExxonMobil Court found that its interpretation was harmonious with the other 
severance tax provisions and was consistent with legislative intent. The Court 
acknowledged that the correct interpretation "must give meaning and relevance to eacn of 
the valuation methods," ExxonMobil, H 16, and rejected the Commission's interpretation 
of the statute because it could not be "reconcile[d] with the valuation provisions of the 
severance tax statutes." Id. at f^ 15. It concluded that "[t]he language of the statute 
contemplates calculation within the immediate vicinity of the point of removal from the 
earth, but it also compels calculation at some point where sales are not a distinct rarity." 
Id. at f 20. Despite the Court's pronouncements on the meaning of the statute, its 
decision on retroactivity has resulted in the Commission's enforcement of an 
interpretation of severance tax law which was not intended by the Legislature and was 
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specifically rejected by this Court. If the ExxonMobil decision on retroactivity is not 
reversed, then the role of the legislature in creating laws is suspended until a Court 
provides the interpretation of that law. Until then, an agency is free to misinterpret and 
misapply law with the added assurance that its misinterpretation will be enforceable for 
the time periods preceding judicial correction of its misinterpretation. 
B. The ExxonMobil Court's Conclusion That The Prospective Relief 
Limitation Was Necessary To "Protect The Solvency Of 
Governmental Entities And To Avoid Administrative Hardship" 
Was Reversible Error. 
There is no precedent which would allow a court to resort to equitable 
considerations to support its refusal to retroactively apply its decision when the first 
Chevron Oil factor has not been satisfied. Nevertheless, the ExxonMobil Court did just 
that when it concluded that the prospective relief limitation was necessary to "protect the 
solvency of governmental entities and to avoid administrative and financial hardship 
caused by retroactive application of rules contrary to those relied on by the taxing 
authorities." ExxonMobil, f 23. This conclusion was clearly erroneous and does not 
support the Court's decision to limit the application of ExxonMobil. 
In Munson v. Chamberlain, 2007 UT 91, this Court did not hesitate to overrule a 
decision which had been made without thorough analysis of the issue when subsequent 
events demonstrated that the decision was clearly erroneous, stating: 
Although we are normally bound by our own precedent, we may overrule it 
where "the decision is clearly erroneous or conditions have changed so as to 
render the prior decision inapplicable." 
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Id, 2007 UT 91, U 20, quoting State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 399 n.3 (Utah 1994).16 
This case presents a similar dilemma where precedent with unforeseen ramifications was 
created by last minute arguments raised by amici parties on an issue which "did not 
benefit from the focus and refinement afforded issues actually litigated in the lower 
courts." Id11 
16In Munson, the District Court had barred the plaintiffs medical expert from 
testifying on the grounds that statutory confidentiality requirements had been violated. 
The district court's decision was based on the Utah Supreme Court's decision in Doe v. 
Maret, 984 P.2d 980 (Utah 1999), wherein the appellant had successfully argued in her 
reply brief to this Court that the appellee's attachment of a notice of intent to his appellate 
brief violated statutory requirements of confidentiality. Based on the Maret decision, the 
district court concluded that Munson's disclosure to her expert witness of documents 
obtained in proceedings before a prelitigation panel violated statutory confidentiality 
requirements and disqualified the expert. This Court reviewed the facts of the case and 
observed that the disclosed documents had been created by Munson's own counsel and 
consulting expert and, therefore, Munson was free to disclose those documents and waive 
any privilege attached thereto. I 
17The Munson Court explained that the precedential value of the prior decision on 
confidentiality of the prelitigation material was minimal in light of the circumstances 
which gave rise to that ruling: 
Our decision to overrule the last paragraph of Maret is supported by the fact 
that it "is not the most weighty of precedents." Id. at 399. The paragraph at 
issue was appended to our opinion in Maret almost as an afterthought. 
Indeed, we devoted only a single paragraph to our analysis of the issue, an 
analysis consisting almost entirely of a conclusory sentence asserting that 
because the notice of intent is part of the proceedings, it must be kept 
confidential. This lack of analysis, combined with the unique way in which 
the issue was presented, reduces the precedential value of the applicable 
language. Unlike the vast majority of cases in which we either affirm or 
assign error to a decision by a lower court, in Maret we were asked to 
exercise our inherent jurisdiction over the proceedings before us to impose 
sanctions for an act that occurred during briefing. Because of this unique 
procedural posture, the issue did not benefit from the focus and refinement 
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After the Commission filed its Opening Brief in the ExxonMobil appeal, the 
Navajo Revitalization Fund and the Uintah Basin Revitalization Fund (the "Amici 
Funds") jointly filed an amicus brief wherein they argued that, if the Court reversed the 
Commission's decision, the decision should be applied prospectively to avoid alleged 
catastrophic budget and solvency problems. Neither the Commission nor other amici 
requested or discussed a prospective relief limitation in their briefing to this Court. The 
Court acknowledged that the evidence provided by the Amici Funds, on which it based its 
unprecedented decision, was scant stating, "the full breadth and depth of the impact is not 
immediately apparent from the record." ExxonMobil, U 23. Nevertheless, the Court held 
that "[t]he revenue concerns cited by the Tax Commission and amici convince us that 
application of our prospective effect doctrine is appropriate in this case." Id. 
Specifically the Court observed that "[l]arge refunds of money already collected and spent 
would pose a great burden on the amici revitalization funds and other relatively small 
governmental entities operating on correspondingly small budgets." Id. Consequently, 
the Court ruled that the statutory interpretation provided in ExxonMobil would not apply 
afforded issues actually litigated in the lower courts. Moreover, because the 
issue was first raised in a reply brief, we were not able to benefit from any 
adversarial briefing of the issue. We accordingly conclude that it is 
appropriate to overrule the last paragraph of our opinion in Doe v. Maret. 
A/., 2007 UT 91,1(21. 
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to "other parties [besides ExxonMobil | w ho may have refund requests, deficiency 
proceedings, or similar matters pending before the Tax Commission." Id. at f 24. 
This decision constitutes reversible error under Munson for three reasons. First, 
the assertions upon which the Court concluded a "great burden" would occur have been 
largely disproved by subsequent events and revelations. Second, the retroactive 
application of ExxonMobil would not have created administrative hardship. Third, the 
Court's refusal to retroactively apply ExxonMobil has resulted in a revenue windfall at the 
expense of taxpayers who are left with no legal means to obtain a refund of illegally 
collected taxes. 
L Facts revealed subsequent to the ExxonMobil decision 
demonstrate that the Court's concern for "amici revitalization 
funds and other relatively small governmental entities" was 
misplaced. 
Since the issuance of the ExxonMobil decision, it has become clear that the threat 
to the solvency of "amici revitalization funds and other relatively small governmental 
entities" was exaggerated.18 For example, the only time the Amici Funds are impacted by 
severance taxes is when the producing wells are located on Indian lands. Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 59-5-116 and 119. Yet the Court made the prospective relief limitation applicable to 
all oil and gas producers, even those whose wells were not located on Indian lands. In 
18ExxonMobil is not suggesting that the Amici Funds or the Commission 
intentionally exaggerated the solvency concerns. Certainly the exaggeration which 
occurred could have been the result of the fact that the only party which briefed this issue 
was the Amici Funds and that this issue had not been raised before the Commission. 
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addition, it is not even clear that the Amici Funds would ever be impacted by refunds 
because there was no evidence that the refunds would have to be issued by the Amici 
Fund. In fact, the refund issued to ExxonMobil was not issued by the Amici Funds, but 
by the State's General Fund. 
It has also become clear that the Court's concern for "other relatively small 
governmental entities" was also misplaced inasmuch as any severance tax money which 
does not go to the Amici Funds goes directly to the State General Fund. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 59-5-115. Thus, there were no other "small governmental entities" which could have 
been negatively impacted by the Court's decision. 
Finally, the revenue concerns addressed by the ExxonMobil Court are not 
implicated by deficiency assessments. Nevertheless, by prohibiting the retroactive 
application of ExxonMobil "whether in refund requests or deficiency proceedings," the 
Court ensured that taxpayers who paid their severance taxes using the correct 
interpretation of law, would be forced to pay millions of dollars in deficiency 
assessments. The Court's decision to prohibit taxpayers who were involved in pending 
deficiency proceedings from relying on ExxonMobil, has resulted in an unfair windfall to 
the government, and, when the wells are on Indian lands, to the revitalization funds. 
Ironically, immediately prior to imposing the prospective relief limitation, the 
Court observed that, when its interpretation of a statute results in a shortfall of anticipated 
revenue, the Legislature has the right to correct the problem by amending the statute: 
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If the legislature established the severance tax scheme to realize a specific 
revenue target and our interpretation of its statutory language does not 
provide that level of revenue, the legislature may amend the relevant 
statutes to provide for a different calculation of the tax that will achieve the 
desired revenue. 
Id., T| 22. Despite this recognition of legislative authority to remedy the unforeseen fiscal 
impact of a court's statutory interpretation, the Court usurped that legislative prerogative 
by depriving taxpayers (other than ExxonMobil) of the right to rely on the correct 
interpretation of the statute when their severance taxes are calculated. 
2. The ExxonMobil Court erred when it concluded that retroactive 
application of the decision would have resulted in administrative 
hardship. 
I 
The ExxonMobil Court also concluded that retroactive application of ExxonMobil 
would have resulted in "administrative . . . hardship." ExxonMobil, ^ 23. Ironically, the 
"administrative hardship" is the direct result of the Commission's continued refusal to 
correctly interpret the severance tax provisions. The suggestion that the retroactive 
application of the correct statutory interpretation (as opposed to a change in law) results 
in an administrative hardship because taxing entities may have to issue refunds is 
unprecedented. 
In Loyal Order of Moose, this Court postponed the effective date of its decision 
overruling a prior interpretation of a statute to avoid the administrative hardship which 
would result from retroactive assessments and to avoid financially burdening the 
taxpayers: 
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Also, if the rule were to be given retroactive effect, the assessment of back 
taxes on properties affected by this rule might well result in an unreasonable 
burden upon all those organizations and governmental bodies associated 
with it. By staying the effective date of our ruling in this case, not only are 
court and agency resources saved, but time also is allowed for organizations 
affected to make needed adjustments. 
Loyal Order of Moose, 657 P.2d at 265. The ExxonMobil Court disregarded the impact 
on taxpayers when it refused to allow retroactive application of the decision. 
Prior to ExxonMobil, there were some taxpayers which had paid their severance 
taxes under the correct interpretation of the severance tax laws. Notwithstanding prior 
contrary administrative and judicial decisions inteipreting "at the well," the Division 
continued to deny refund requests and issue deficiency assessments based on its 
misinterpretation of severance tax laws. The position taken by the Division and the 
Commission directly resulted in an accumulation of severance tax appeals over a number 
of years. The hardship, if it existed, was a direct result of the agency's persistent refusal 
to accept what was ultimately determined to be the correct interpretation of the severance 
tax provisions. 
Because severance taxes had been paid based on conflicting interpretations of the 
severance tax laws, whatever interpretation the Court adopted would have necessarily 
resulted in some administrative activities. Nevertheless, the ExxonMobil Court concluded 
that the only way to avoid administrative hardship was to deprive severance taxpayers of 
the retroactive application of the ExxonMobil decision-thus insuring that the state general 
fund and the revitalization funds would receive an unexpected windfall from those parties 
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who had paid severance taxes under the correct interpretation of the severance tax 
statutes. Pittsburgh & Midway Coal Mining Co. v. Department of Revenue, 161 Ariz. 
135, 138-39, 776 P.2d 1061, 1064-65 (1989) ("An honorable government would not keep 
taxes to which it is not entitled."). 
In addition to enforcing deficiency assessments which were pending during the 
ExxonMobil decision, the Commission has interpreted the Court's prospective relief 
limitation to authorize additional severance tax deficiency assessments against taxpayers 
which paid their severance taxes based on the correct interpretation of the severance tax 
provisions prior to the ExxonMobil decision. This result was prohibited by this Court in 
Loyal Order of Moose when the Court postponed the effective date of its decision 
because "if the rule were to be given retroactive effect, the assessment of back taxes on 
properties affected by this rule might well result in an unreasonable burden." Loyal 
Order of Moose, 657 P.2d at 265. The Division's issuance of post-ExxonMobil 
deficiency assessments demonstrates the error in the Court's conclusion that 
administrative hardship would have resulted from retroactive application of its decision 
inasmuch as the Division is willing to undergo administrative activity to obtain additional 
revenue under an interpretation of the severance tax laws which was rejected by the 
ExxonMobil Court. Inasmuch as the Division is not deterred by "administrative hardship" 
associated with deficiency assessments, it is disingenuous to suggest that allowing refund 
requests under ExxonMobil would have resulted in "administrative hardship." 
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3, The prospective relief limitation deprives taxpayers of their 
statutory right to a refund of illegally assessed taxes. 
The Court's conclusion that "administrative hardship" forecloses the right to a 
refund effectively repeals the taxpayer's statutory right to a refund of illegally collected 
taxes. The refund of taxes illegally collected is a statutory obligation: 
In all cases of levy of taxes, licenses, or other demands for public revenue 
which is deemed unlawful by the party whose property is taxed, or from 
whom the tax or license is demanded or enforced, that party may pay under 
protest the tax or license, or any part deemed unlawful, to the officers 
designated and authorized by law to collect the tax or license; and then the 
party so paying or a legal representative may bring an action in the tax 
division of the appropriate district court against the officer to whom the tax 
or license was paid, or against the state, county, municipality, or other 
taxing entity on whose behalf it was collected, to recover the tax or license 
or any portion of the tax or license paid under protest. 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-301. The ExxonMobil Court's conclusion that the fulfillment of 
this statutory responsibility results in an "administrative hardship," effectively repeals this 
statute for all taxpayers seeking a refund. Certainly the issuance of a refund has a 
financial impact on the entities which receive taxes. However, statutes of limitations are 
the means utilized by the legislature to protect governmental solvency. Thus, when the 
taxing provisions are misapplied or misinterpreted, a taxpayer has the legal right, under 
the laws of this state, to request a refund or to challenge a deficiency so long as the action 
is initiated in a timely manner. Tucson Elec. Power Co. v. Apache Co., 185 Ariz. 5, 20, 
912 P.2d 9, 24 (Ariz. App. 1995) ("[W]e find it difficult to conceive how requiring the 
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state and the affected counties to refund the proceeds of an illegal tax to those who paid it 
under protest could be viewed as 'substantially inequitable.'"). 
The Court's decision to limit the application of ExxonMobil is dangerous 
precedent which invites abuse of taxing powers. The ExxonMobil prospective relief 
proclamation permits the Commission and other taxing entities to apply taxing provisions 
in a manner which allows them to collect taxes to which they are not legally entitled. 
They may persist in their denial of refund requests and continue to seek deficiencies 
under their statutory misinterpretations until this Court ultimately provides the correct 
interpretation of the statute. Once a judicial interpretation of that statute is rendered, the 
taxing entities could request a prospective relief limitation simply by alleging 
"administrative and financial hardship." The longer the taxing entities have persisted in 
their misapplication of the statute, the greater their alleged financial interest will be. The 
practical result of the ExxonMobil Court's refusal to give retroactive effect to its 
interpretation of a tax statute is to give taxing entities virtual immunity from refund 
actions and deficiency proceedings. Under ExxonMobil, the only taxpayer which would 
receive retroactive relief when a tax statute is finally given the correct interpretation 
would be the one which wins the race to the courthouse. As a result, all other taxpayers, 
otherwise entitled to relief under Utah Code Ann. §§ 59-1-301 (refund actions) and 59-1-
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501 (deficiency proceedings), would be denied refunds or forced to pay an illegal 
deficiency despite statutory mechanisms designed to prevent this injustice.l9 
CONCLUSION 
In view of the ExxonMobil Court's specific exclusion of ExxonMobil from the 
prospective effect limitation, this Court should reverse the Commission's narrowing of 
the scope of retroactive relief authorized by the Court for ExxonMobil and direct the 
Commission to issue the refunds requested by ExxonMobil and MEPNA. Alternatively, 
Petitioners would request that this Court reconsider and reverse its imposition of the 
prospective effect limitation in ExxonMobil. 
DATED this 21st day of May, 2009. 
WOOD CRAPO LLC 
David J. Crapo 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
l9Under Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-109, a severance taxpayer which believes it has 
overpaid severance taxes has the legal right to "requestf] an adjudicative proceeding and 
the correction of the assessed tax." As a result of ExxonMobil's prospective relief 
proclamation, the Commission is stripped of the ability to "correct" a tax assessment 
which does not comply with statutory provisions. 
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Appearances: 
For Petitioner: David Crapo, Attorney at Law 
For Respondent: Clark Snelson, Assistant Attorney General 
Shelly Robinson, Assistant Director, Auditing 
Inge-Lise Goss, Manager, Oil & Gas Auditing 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This matter is before the Commission on Petitioners' Motion for Summary judgment filed on 
February 26, 2008 ("Motion") In the Motion, Petitioners request that the Commission grant summary 
judgment to ExxonMobil by ordering the Division to grant ExxonMobil's and MEPNA's refund requests. 
Respondent submitted a Response to Petitioners' Motion for Summary Judgment on April 4,2008. Petitioner 
submitted aReply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment on April 25,2008. A Hearing 
on the Motion for Summary Judgment was held on June 17, 2008. 
SCOPE OF REVIEW 
Under Rule 56 of the Utah rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is appropriate where 
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and the moving party is entitled a judgment as a matter of law. 
Sorremon v Beers, 585 P.2d 458, 460 (Utah 1978); Utah Department of Environmental Quality v Wind 
River Petroleum, 881 P.2d 868 (Utah 1994). On Summary Judgment, all facts and all reasonable inferences 
drawn from those facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Wayment v Clear 
Channel Broadcasting, Inc., 2005 UT 25, 116 P.3d 271. A summary judgment shall be rendered by the Tax 
Commission, "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with 
the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as 1o any material fact and that the moving party is 
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." (Utah R. Civ.P. 56; Utah Code Ann. Sec. 63-46b-l(4).) 
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STATEMENT OF MATERIAL UNDISPUTED FACTS 
The following facts are material to the Commission's decision on Petitioners' Motion and are 
undisputed: 
1. Exxon Mobil Corporation ("ExxonMobil**) is the result of a merger, on November 30,1999, 
between Mobil Corporation and a wholly-owned subsidiary of Exxon Corporation. 
2. Prior to the merger Mobil Exploration and Producing North American ("MEPNA,r) was a 
wholly owned subsidiary of Mobil Corporation. As a result of the merger, MEPNA became a second-tier, 
wholly-owned subsidiary of ExxonMobil. 
3. MEPNA still exists today as a separate legal entity. 
4. During the 1990's MEPNA owned and operated oil and gas producing wells within the 
Greater Aneth Field in Southern Utah. Those wells were located in the McElmo Creek Unit and the 
Ratherford Unit. The records of the Utah Division of Oil and Gas Mining ("DOGMA") identify MEPNA as 
the operator of the McElmo Creek unit from April L 1986 through May ,1,2001, and of the Ratherford unit 
from September 1,1993 through May 1,2001. After May 1,2001, the DOGMA records identify the operator 
of both the McElmo Creek and Ratherford units as ExxonMobil Oil Corp. 
5. Prior to the merger, MEPNA had owned 39.956% of the production from the McElmo Creek 
Unit Exxon Corporation owned 24.787% and the remainder of the production was owned by Texaco and The 
Bureau of Indian Affairs. 
6. Prior to the merger, MEPNA had owned 64.367% of the production from the Ratherford Unit 
Exxon Corporation did not own any production from that field. The remaining production was owned by 
Texaco, Chieftan and The Bureau of Indian Affairs. 
7 Prom 1993 through 1998, MEPNA filed returns and paid severance taxes on its production of 
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oil and gas from the Greater Aneth Fieid by calculating the value of the oil on the price that was paid at the 
point of sale. * 
8. After the merger, in 1999, ExxonMobil filed amended severance tax returns, amending the 
original returns fded by MEPNA for the 1993 through 1998 tax years. The amended severance tax returns 
were based on the value of the oil produced using the net-back method, which resulted in lower tax amounts 
than MEPNA had claimed on the original severance tax returns for each of the years. 
9. The Auditing Division of the Utah State Tax Commission dented ExxonMobil's requests for 
refund regarding the returns originally filed by MEPNA for the 1993 through 1998 tax years. 
10. ExxonMobil appealed the denial of the refund requests to the Utah State Tax Commission, 
The requests for redetermination of the refund claims for overpayment of taxes paid by MEPNA were 
combined for the periods from 1993 through 1998 into one appeal, which was identified as ExxonMobil 
Corporation v. Auditing Division of the Utah State Tax Commission, Appeal No. 00-0901 (the "Original 
Appeal"). After a Formal Hearing, the Commission upheld the Division's denial of the combined refund 
requests. 
11. ExxonMobil appealed the Commission's decision in the Original Appeal to the Utah Supreme 
Court. 
12. Because MEPNA was a wholly owned subsidiary of ExxonMobil all litigation surrounding 
the refund requests was managed and financed by ExxonMobil. 
13. The Utah Supreme Court issued its decision on November 25, 2003, in ExxonMobil 
Corporation v. Utah State Tax Commission, 2003 UT 53, 87 P.3d 706 (2003), remandingthe matter back to 
1 Whether these calculations by MEPNA were made using the first method required by Utah Code Ann, Sec. 59-5-
103, arms-length contracts at the point the oil was sold, is not material to the Commission's decision on Summary 
Judgment. The Respondent's contention that this is a disputed fact is not relevant to this proceeding. 
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the Tax Commission.2 
14. On November 21, 2005, the Commission directed the Division to issue a severance tax refund 
to Exxon Mobil in the amount of $2,168,334.87 plus statutory interest. 
15. On January 6, 2006, the Commission issued a refund check for $3,387,991.91 (the 
$2,168,334.87 plus statutory interest) payable to ExxonMobil. 
16. Exxon Corporation had timely filed severance tax returns for the 1998 and 1999 tax years. 
Exxon Corporation became ExxonMobil as a result of the 1999 merger. 
17. On or about May 24, 2005, ExxonMobil filed an amended 1998 severance tax return that 
indicated Exxon Corporation had made an overpayment of $71,105 with its original return. ExxonMobil 
alleged that the overpayment resulted from the fact the Exxon Corporation had not fully deducted 
transportation costs or correctly asserted applicable oil stripper exemptions in the original severance tax 
returns. By Statutory Notice dated May 31,2006, the Division denied most of the 1998 refund request relating 
to the tax paid by Exxon Corporation. ExxonMobi 1 appealed the denial to the Utah State Tax Commission and 
the appeal was designated as Appeal No, 06-0915. 
18. On or about May 24, 2005, ExxonMobil filed an amended 1999 severance tax return that 
indicated Exxon Corporation had made an overpayment of $94,303. By Statutory Notice dated August 30, 
2006, the Division informed ExxonMobil that the severance tax would be reduced by only $15,500.77. 
ExxonMobil appealed the denial of the remainder of the refund to the Utah State Tax Commission and the 
appeal was designated as Appeal No. 06-1218. 
19. For the tax year 1999, MEPNA had timely filed an annual return separately from the annual 
2 Although the parties each argue that various portions of the Utah Supreme Court's decision support their positions, 
the decision itself does not give rise to a dispute of fact. The decision provides legal guidance, appropriate for the 
Commission to consider in making its determination on whether the Petitioners are entitled to judgment as a matter 
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return filed by ExxonMobil MEPNA's annual return reported MEPNA's share of production from the 
McElmo Creek Unit and the Ratherford Unit MEPNA's annual return did not report production owned by the 
former Exxon Corporation. 
20. On or about May 22, 2006, MEPNA filed an amended 1999 severance tax return, which 
indicated an overpayment of $285,842. The overpayment resulted from the fact that MEPNA had not fully 
deducted transportation costs in its original severance tax return. On February 1,2007, the Division granted 
MEPNA's 1999 refund request in its entirety. 
21. For the 2000 tax year, MEPNA had filed an annual return separately from the annual return 
filed by ExxonMobil, reporting MEPNA 5s share of production from the McElmo Creek Unit and the 
Ratherford Unit MEPN A^s annual return did not report production owned by the former Exxon Corporation. 
22. On or about February 28,2007, MEPNA filed an amended 2000 severance tax return, which 
indicated an overpayment of S261,444. By Statutory Notice dated August 24, 2007, the Division informed 
MEPNA that it denied the severance tax refund.3 MEPNA timely filed an appeal of the denial, and the appeal 
is identified as Appeal No. 07-1118. 
23. ExxonMobil timely filed a severance tax return for the 2000 tax year, reporting its share of 
production from wells in the McElmo Creek Unit separately from the production owned by MEPNA. The 
share of production reported by ExxonMobil was based on Exxon Corporation's interest in production from 
the McElmo Creek Unit prior to the Merger. 
24. On or about February 28, 2007, ExxonMobil filed an amended severance tax return for the 
2000 tax year, which indicated an overpayment of $84,649. By Statutory Notice dated August 24,2007, the 
of law. 
3 The parties argue there are facts in dispute regarding why this and the subsequent refunds were denied. However. 
the reason is not material to the Commission's decision in this matter. 
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Division informed ExxonMobil that it had denied its severance tax refund request for the 2000 tax year. 
ExxonMobil timely appealed the denial to the State Tax Commission and the appeal was identified as Appeal 
No. 07-1124. 
25. ExxonMobil filed timely severance tax returns for the tax years 2001 through 2003. During 
the first quarter of 2001, ExxonMobil's quarterly report did not include production owned by MEPNA from 
the McEimo Creek Unit or any production from the Ratherford Unit. After the first quarter of 2001, 
ExxonMobil combined the data, which had, prior to that time, been separately reported by MEPNA and the 
former Exxon Corporation. Beginaing the second quarter of 2001 and continuing through 2003 ExxonMobil 
filed annual returns reporting combined production from the McEimo Creek Unit and the Ratherford Unit in 
which ExxonMobil or its wholly-owned subsidiary, MEPNA, had an interest. 
26. On or about February 28, 2007, ExxonMobil filed amended severance tax returns for the 
2001, 2002 and 2003 tax years, which indicated overpayments of $359,689, 5400,155.83 and $372,568.62 
respectively. ExxonMobil alleged that the overpayment resulted from the fact that ExxonMobil had not fully 
deducted transportation costs in its original severance tax returns. 
27. By Statutory Notice dated August 24, 2007, the Division informed ExxonMobil that it had 
denied its severence tax refund request for the 2001 through 2003 tax years. ExxonMobil timely appealed the 
denial to the State Tax Commission and the appeal was identified as Appeal No. 07-1124, 
ANALYSIS 
In the Motion, Petitioners request that the Commission order Respondent to issue the refund 
requests, arguing that they are entitled to retroactive relief pursuant to the Utah Supreme Court's decision in 
ExxonMobil Corporation v. Utah State Tax Commission, 2003 UT 53, 87 P.3d 706 (2003). The facts material 
to whether the Petitioners in this matter are entitled to retroactive relief, as provided by the Supreme Court in 
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ExxonMobil Corporation, are not in dispute. The Commission simply must interpret the Utah Supreme 
Court's decision and the application of that decision to the subsequent refund requests filed by MEPNA and 
ExxonMobil that are the subject of this proceeding. That the parties have differences in opinion regarding the 
application of the decision to the undisputed facts, does not of itself constitute a dispute of fact. 
From the undisputed facts, the Commission notes that although the Original Appeal involved 
refund requests filed by ExxonMobil for taxes originally paid by MEPNA for multiple years (1993-1998), the 
requests had been combined into one appeal, that being Appeal No. 00-0901. As it was ExxonMobil that filed 
the refund requests subject to the Original Appeal, the Commission listed ExxonMobil as the Petitioner on the 
appeal, rather than MEPNA. In its decision in the Original Appeal, the Commission denied the combined 
refund request It was this denial that ExxonMobil had been appealed to the Utah Supreme Court and was the 
subject of the Court's decision in ExxonMobil Corporation. Further, all the subsequent refund requests that 
are now at issue in this proceeding, filed by either MEPNA or ExxonMobil, were filed at the Tax Commission 
years after November 25,2003, when the Utah Supreme Court issued its decision in ExxonMobil Corporation. 
The Utah Supreme Court listed ExxonMobil Corporation as the Petitioner in its proceeding. 
Id. at 706. The Court noted ExxonMobil Corporation filed the petition and then defined it as "ExxonMobil." 
Id. at 707. In that decision the Court "reverse[d] the Tax Commission's determination that severance taxes 
should be based on the value of oil and gas at the point of eventual sale5' and found that "[valuation must 
occur in the immediate vicinity of the well . , ." Id. at 712. The Supreme Court remanded the matter back to 
the Tax Commission for "further adjudication of [ExxonMobil's] claim for a refund . . ." Id. After further 
adjudication, the Tax Commission ordered the Division to issue a refund to ExxonMobil in the amount of 
$2,168,334.87 plus interest 
However, the Court had limited its decision to prospective application for other severance 
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taxpayers, stating in its conclusion, "Although ExxonMobil is entitled to further adjudication of its claim for a 
refund, as to other parties who may have refund requests, deficiency proceedings, or similar matters pending 
before the Tax Commission, our holding is to apply prospectively only." Id. at 712. ExxonMobil argues in the 
appeals currently before the Commission that it is entitled to the same retroactive application granted by the 
Supreme Court in the Original Appeal for all the subsequent refund requests. 
It is clear from the Court's decision in this matter that it was contemplating a specific refund 
request, t\\t combined requests from the Original Appeal. The Court considered the combined refund requests 
to be a single request for refund. The Court indicated the matter under review was the "Tax Commission [] 
decision upholding the denial of ExxonMobil's request for a refund . . ." Id. at 707. In the Factual 
Background, the Court stated that the case involved "a refund of severance taxes . . . from January 1, 1993 
through December 31, 1998." Id. at 707. The Court resolved the matter relating to the Tax Commission's 
denial of "ExxonMobil's request for a refund." Id. at 708. See aho Id. at 709 ("the requested refund" and 
"ExxonMobil's refund request"). The Commission notes there is no mention, or acknowledgment in the 
Court's decision that ExxonMobil might subsequently file additional refund requests for later periods or 
different subsidiaries than the "request for a refund" before the Court in that proceeding. 
It is also clear from the express language of the Court that it intended to iim it the refunds that 
would otherwise result from its decision because of the financial impact to governmental entities. The Court in 
ExxonMobil Corporation explained, at Id. at 712, why it had applied its prospective effect doctrine to most 
refunds, stating: 
The revenue concerns cited by the Tax Commission and amici convince us that 
application of our prospective effect doctrine is appropriate in this case. When 
invalidating the actions of a taxing authority, we have long recognized that our 
decisions may be given prospective effect to protect the solvency of governmental 
entities and to avoid administrative and financial hardship caused by retroactive 
application of rules contrary to those relied on by the taxing authorities. See, e.g., 
- 9 -
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RioAlgomCorp. v. San Juan County. 681 P.2d 184,196 (Utah 1984). Werecognize, 
however, that preventing the retroactive application of the rule to ExxonMobil, which 
has expended considerable time and resources to attack the actions of the Tax 
Commission, would both deprive ExxonMobil of the fruits of victory and 
"potentially] , , , discourag[e] other litigants from challenging [actions] of 
questionable validity " V-l Oil Co v Utah State Tax Comm % 942 P.2d 906, 914 
(Utah 1996). (citing Rio Algom, 681 P.2d at 196.).) We give our holding this 
selectively prospective application because we are convinced that retroactive 
application could result in large refunds of taxes already collected and spent by 
government entities. Although the full breadth and depth of the impact is not 
immediately apparent from the record before us, no doubt it would be substantial and 
involve funds already budgeted, collected, and spent. Large refunds of money 
already collected and spent would pose a great burden on the amici revitalization 
funds and other relatively small governmental entities operation on correspondingly 
small budgets. Thus, whether in refund requests or deficiency proceedings, as to all 
but ExxonMobil the rule announced today is to have prospective application oniy. 
The Court's analysis was driven by policy considerations, best met by interpreting the Court's 
retroactive application narrowly to only include the "refund request" before the court in ExxonMobil 
Corporation, The proposed interpretation of the Petitioners is not well supported by the Court's policy-driven 
analysis because that interpretation greatly extends the Court's limited retroactive application to refund 
requests unknown to the Court at the time of the decision. Using the facts before it, the Court weighed the 
policy concerns of (1) protecting the revenue concerns of government entities, and (2) providing the litigant the 
fruits of victory and not discouraging prospective litigants. In light of the Court's discussion, the Court likely 
intended to broadly protect the small government entities from other refund requests not before it. Based on 
the retroactive application of the Supreme Court's decision on the "refund request" that was at issue before the 
Court, a refund check in the amount of $3,387,991.91 was issued to ExxonMobil, providing ExxonMobil the 
fruits of victory. 
Lastly, it is clear from the Court's conclusion in ExxonMobil Corporation, that although it 
granted retroactive application of its decision to ExxonMobil, and not any other party, the retroactive 
application granted was limited to the specific claim for refund before the Court during that proceeding. The 
- 1 0 -
0003C3 
000518 
Appeal Mos. 06-0915, etal. 
Commission recognizes the Court's statement that "as to all but ExxonMobil the rule announced today is to 
have prospective application only" {Id. at 712) could, in isolation, be interpreted to allow other claims by 
ExxonMobil However, considering the entirety of the decision the retroactive relief was limited to the refund 
claim before the Court in that matter. The Court's conclusion, at Id, at 712, was not to grant ExxonMobil 
retroactive relief for any and ail additional refund claims it may eventually file, but instead, specified that". . 
. ExxonMobil is entitled to further adjudication of its claim for a refund, as to other parties who may have 
refund requests, deficiency proceedings, or similar matters pending before the Tax Commission, our holding is 
to apply prospectively only.'" The Court's reference to "its claim for a refund" indicates the retroactive reiief 
was limited to the refund claim that was before it in that proceeding. 
If the Court had intended a broader application of the selective retroactive relief it would have 
been specific on that point. One of the cases the Court in ExxonMobil Corporation cited as precedent for the 
selective retroactive application was Rio Algom Corp v. San Juan Comity, 681 P. 2d 184,196 (Utah 1984). In 
Rio Algom the Court weighed the need to preserve the financial solvency of local governments against 
discouraging challenges to statutes of questionable validly and concluded that retroactive application would 
apply only to the stated plaintiffs in that case and only to the specific refund claim for which the suit was 
brought The Court also applied a selective retroactive application of its decision in V-1 Oil Co. v Utah State 
Tax Comm 'n, 942 P,2d 906 (Utah 1996). In that case V-1 requested injunctive relief on behalf of itself and all 
similarly situated parties. The Court applied its decision prospectively as to all the other similarly situated 
parties, but for V-1 the decision was applied "retroactive to the year in which V-1 alleges it began to pay the 
surcharge, subject only to any applicable statutes of limitations and to the extent that V-1 can demonstrate that 
4 In its Memorandum m Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, the Petitioner, at page v, prg. 16, characterized 
the Supreme Court's decision to be one that, according to Petitioner, "granted ExxonMobil's requests for severance 
tax refunds/' (Emphasis added.) The Commission finds this misleading as the Court always referred only to a single 
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it paid the surcharge..." Id. at 915. In both of those cases the Court fashioned the selective retroactive relief 
in a manner it found appropriate based on the facts and circumstances before it. Therefore, there is no reason 
for the Commission to conclude that when the Court in ExxonMobil Corporation stated that ExxonMobil was 
entitled to "further adjudication of its claim for a refund" it meant something other than the specific refund 
claim that was before it in the matter-
It is the conclusion of the Tax Commission that ExxonMobil is not entitled to the retroactive 
application of the Court's decision in ExxonMobil Corporation to the refund requests at issue in these appeals 
that are now before the Commission. Therefore, ExxonMobil is not entitled as a matter of law to the Summary 
Judgment requested. 
ORDER 
Based upon the forgoing, Petitioners' Motion for Summary Judgment is denied. It is so 
ordered. 
DATED this /7 day of A^HZ-^-g^^ 2008. 
C^ijus^r^— 
Jaae Phan 
Administrative Law Judge 
request or single claim for a refund from ExxonMobile. 
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BY ORDER OF THE COMMISSION 
The undersigned have reviewed this motion and concur in this decision 
DATED this / 7 day of (^fa^ 
Pam Hendnckson 
Commission (than 
Marc B 
Commisspofier 
^ % 2 \ ^ X?0foU 
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V £ o r \ f ^ 
' \ H P A R Bruce Johnson 
Commissioner 
"^i*^— 
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DISSENT 
I respectfully dissent from my colleagues I interpret ExxonMobil Corporation v C/ra/7 S/a/e 
Tax Commission (Utah 2003) differently and as such hold Petitioners are entitled to summary judgment for 
retroactive lehef 
Retroactive relief does apply to Petitioners for all the years in question m this ordei The Utah 
Supreme Court expected administrative remedy and the application of its ruling to the parties at issue -
ExxonMobil and its wholly owned subsidiary, Mobil Exploration and Producing North American (MEPNA) -
the Petitioneis ExxonMobil and MEPNA are not the "other parties,' referied to m ExxonMobil, but the 
claimants to whom "the fruits of victory" wereawaided "whether in refund requests or deficiency pioceedings5" 
as the Utah Supreme Court wiote in ExxonMobil 
The Majority has chosen a narrow reading of ExxonMobil The Majonty supports its narrow 
reading of ExxonMobil citing what they hold to be the Court's "policy considerations5* and "policy-driven 
analysis " They use this to say, "the Court hkely intended to broadly protect the small government entities 
- 1 3 -
000521 013 
Appeal Nos. 06-0915, etai. 
from other refund requests not before it." To support this position, the Majority relies on Rio Algom Corp. v 
San Juan Count)' (Utah 1984) and V-l Oil Company v. Utah State Tax Commission and the Utah State 
Department of Environmental Quality (Utah 1996) claiming 'the Court fashioned selective retroactive relief in 
a maimer it found appropriate based on the facts and circumstances before it." 
The Majority attempts to use RioAlgom to support its narrow reading of ExxonMobil and its 
interpretation that "its claim for a refund " is the claim before the Court. The Majority wrote, "However, 
considering the entirety of the decision the retroactive relief was limited to the refund claim before the Court in 
that matter. . .. The Court's reference to s its claim for a refund' indicates the retroactive relief was limited to 
the refund claim that was before it in that proceeding." 
The Majority fails to provide an analysis as to why a strict reading of RioAlgom applies to this 
matter. The Majority's narrow reading of the five words "its claim for a refund" actually does a disservice to 
the desire of the Court, which was to not deprive the claimants the fruits of victory whether in refund requests 
or deficiency proceedings. In addition, the Majority does not offer an analysis of what ExxonMobil means in 
its entirety. The Court has not delineated in their decisions what the circumstances are for a claimant to be 
afforded a refund for a year, to a year or for all years forward. 
The Court could have specifically limited ExxonMobil to the years before it as it did in Rio 
Algorn, The Court did not; thus, there is nothing in the ExxonMobil decision to indicate relief for the Petitioner 
is limited to the years that were before the Court. 
The Majority also cites V-l to support its position of selective and limited retrospective 
application. In that case the Court penned the following: 
Prospective application of our decision to V-l, the only party' to this appeal, would 
have the potential of discouraging other litigants from challenging statutes of 
questionable validity. RioAlgom,681 P.2dall96, Indeed, we have said in the past 
that it would be unconscionable to deprive the litigant who has sustained the burden 
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of attacking an unconstitutional statute of the fruits of victory Salt Lake City v 
Ohms, 881 P.2d 884, 854-55 (Utah 1994); see also Latrum v, Utah State Bd. of 
Pardons, 870 P.2d 902, 914 (Utah 1993). Therefore as to V-l our decision is 
retroactive to the year in which V-l alleges it began to pay the surcharge, 
subject only to any applicable statutes of limitations and to the extent that V-l 
can demonstrate that it paid the surcharge on motor fuels. See Rio Algom 681 
P.2d at 196. (Emphasis added) 
In V-l, prospective application applied to other similarly situated parties, not [he claimant, V-
1. Furthermore V-l was afforded retroactive treatment to the year it could prove it paid the surcharge and 
forward to the date of the issuance of the Court's decision. 
There are two avenues for relief as outlined in the cases Rio Algom and V-l, In a reading of 
all the cases, there is a different approach to each. The Majority has not explained why a Rio Algom analysis is 
controlling in this matter. To use the Majority's words - "reading in its entirety" - the fact situation in 
ExxonMobil is more similar to V-l. 
In Rio Algom, the tax collected was a centrally assessed tax, distributed to local government 
entities. In VL the tax was a surcharge collected by the State for a petroleum tank storage fund or general pool 
in which large and small owners and operators participated. In ExxonMobil, a portion of the severance tax 
collected was allocated to area specific revitalization funds, but the greater amount was credited to the general 
fund for statewide purposes. 
Although some separate entities benefit from the taxes paid by ExxonMobil, the 
overwhelming amount goes to the State as a whole, thus the impact on small funds is less in the matter before 
us than in Rio Algom. In V-l, the Court deemed the State could separately address the amount of funds needed 
in the pool and replacement of funds to the pool rather than deprive the litigant the fruits of victory. As such, 
in V-l the Court made their ruling retroactive to the year claimant V-l could show it began to pay the 
surcharge. 
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The factual scenarios in V-l and in ExxonMobil share common elements, all or most of the 
monies collected were ultimately retained with the State; the State was better positioned (than smaller local 
entities) to address changes to the funds and provide solutions to protect the solvency of the funds. Therefore, 
the V-l analysis applies to ExxonMobil Using the V-l approach, claimant ExxonMobil is entitled to the 
requested relief. 
In ExxonMobil the Court wrote: 
Thus, whether in refund requests or deficiency proceedings, as to ail but 
ExxonMobil, the rule announced today is to have prospective application 
only. (Emphasis added) 
Had it wanted, the Court could have specifically limited the retrospective relief as it did in Rio 
Algom\ instead the Court more closely followed its actions in V-l • Until the Court chooses to clarify otherwise, 
I hold a commonsense reading of ExxonMobil compels retroactive treatment to the year for which the suit for 
the refund was brought and up to the issuance of the Court's decision. 
Petitioners, ExxonMobil and MEPNA, filed amended severance tax returns because it 
expected Respondent, the Auditing Division of the Sate Tax Commission to honor the 2003 Supreme Court 
ExxonMobil ruling and address refund requests based on ExxonMobil. Petitioners properly pursued the 
administrative remedy by filing amended returns believing correctly, ExxonMobil was applicable to them and 
their amended returns. Unfortunately, Petitioners received mixed messages from Respondent 
ExxonMobil Corporation filed amended returns for tax years 1998 and 1999 on May 19 and 
May 24, 2005 respectively. For both years, partial refunds were granted to ExxonMobil. 
MEPNA filed an amended return for 1999 on May 22,2006 - nine days before Respondent 
issued a decision on ExxonMobil's 1998 amended return (issued May 31,2006) and more than 90 days before 
Respondent issued a decision on ExxonMobil's 1999 amended return (issued August 30,2006). MEPNA's 
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requested refund was granted in its entirety. 
Respondent's actions would suggest that Petitioner's refund requests would be addressed 
administratively by Respondent based on ExxonMobil Accordingly, Petitioners filed amended returns for tax 
years 2000 - 2003 all on February 28. 2007, exactly 27 days after Respondent granted in whole the refund 
based on MEPNA's 1999 amended returns Except tins time, five and half months later. Respondent denied 
all the amended returns filed for tax years 2000-2003. 
Why Petitioner chose to file its first amended returns 18 months after the ExxonMobil decision 
instead of sooner eludes me, however, based on the Supreme Court decision, it is reasonable for Petitioner to 
assume it could file amended returns for the years not part of its Supreme Court appeal, but up to the yeai 
ExxonMobil was issued All tax years cannot be presented at one time, as taxes must be filed each year 
Neither the Petitioner nor the Respondent would have known to value oil and gas "m the immediate vicinity of 
the well with the oil and gas remaining in a relatively natural state" for the purposes of applying the seveiance 
tax until ExxonMobil was issued in "November 2003 Therefore, as there are no disputed issues of material 
fact, Petitioners are entitled to summary judgment foi retroactive relief 
1 understand gi anting a refund to an oil company may be unpopular in the cm rent 
environment, however, the facts and legal precedent cannot compel a different outcome. Had my position been 
the ruling of this body, the Governor and Legislature would have needed to be informed of the potential budget 
impact, and it would have been my hope that Petitioners would have used any refund to continue to invest in 
Utah's economy through infrastructure, jobs and a long-term presence in Utah. In the end, I am most wary 
of the precedent the Majority opinion sets for subsequent taxpayers and entities seeking administrative 
remedy and relief based on a court decision. 
It is an often-cited principle to be cautious when interpreting tax statutes against taxpayers. As 
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the Supreme Court wrote in County Board of Equalization of Wasatch County v. Utah Stale Tax Commission 
and Strawberry Water Users Association (Utah 1997) 
It is an established rule in the construction of tax statutes that if any doubt exists as to 
the meaning of the statute, "our practice is construe taxation statutes liberally in favor 
of the taxpayer, ieaving it to the legislature to clarify an intent to be more restrictive if 
such intent exists." Salt Lake County v. State Tax Commission 779 P .2d 1131, 
1332 (Utah 1989). 
If there is any ambiguity in the reading and application of retroactivity and prospectivity as it 
relates to the Court's cases, I have applied that principle in favor of the taxpayer. 
&Ch 
D5Arcy Dixon Pignanj 
Commissioner 
Notice: You have twenty (20) days after the date of this order to file a Request for Reconsideration with the 
Tax Commission Appeals Unit pursuant to Utah Code Sec. 63G-4-302. A Request for Reconsideration must 
allege newly discovered evidence or a mistake of law or fact. If you do not file a Request for Reconsideration 
with the Commission, this order constitutes final agency action. You have thirty (30) days after the date of this 
order to pursue judicial review of this order in accordance with Utah Code Sec. 59-1-601 et seq, & 63G-4-401 
et seq. 
JKP/06-0915 sjcU 
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the word "production" in Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-
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the parties; (3) given the ambiguity in the statute, the 
supreme court was compelled to construe a taxation stat-
ute liberally in favor of the taxpayer; and (4) the oil and 
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the point of sale, but rather in the immediate vicinity of 
the point at which the oil or gas was physically removed 
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production was complete, that point had to have been 
one at which sales of the oil and gas actually occurred. 
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OPINION BY: WILKINS 
OPINION 
[**707] WILKINS, Justice: 
[*P1] ExxonMobil Corporation ("ExxonMobil") 
filed a petition for review of a Utah State Tax Commis-
sion ("Tax Commission") decision upholding the denial 
of ExxonMobil's [* **2] request for a refund of allegedly 
miscalculated severance taxes on certain oil and gas in-
terests. We reverse. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
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[*P2] The essential facts of this case are not in dis-
pute. ExxonMobil requested a refund of severance taxes 
it believes it overpaid from January 1, 1993 through De-
cember 31, 1998. During that period, ExxonMobil oper-
ated numerous oil and gas wells in southeastern Utah that 
were subject to the severance tax imposed by Utah Code 
Ann, sections 59-5-101 through-119 (2000). 
[*P3] ExxonMobil's operation of the wells involves 
removing the oil and gas from the earth at the mouth of 
the well. At that point, the oil and gas is in an emulsion 
form, mixed with impurities such as water and sand. The 
impurities in the emulsion are commonly known as basic 
sediment and water ("BS&W"). At the point of removal 
[**708] from the earth, the entire emulsion is often re-
ferred to as total production and is conveyed from the 
mouth of the well, through a valve structure, and usually 
into a separator tank or through pipelines for additional 
refining. The emulsion "is almost never sold directly 
from the [valve structure]." Selling oil and [***3] gas 
from the valve structure could be done, however, if some 
sort of portable testing device were brought to the site to 
measure volumes. Separator tanks are generally located 
in the immediate vicinity of the mouth of the well and 
allow the components of the emulsion to separate so that 
much of the BS&W is removed from the oil and gas. It 
appears from the record that any gas is generally sepa-
rated from the rest of the emulsion at this point, while the 
oil and the remainder of the emulsion are transported 
together. Sometimes oil and gas are sold at this point, 
having been separated to some degree from the BS&W 
and readied for transport to other facilities. 
[*P4] When the oil is not sold from a separator 
tank, the remaining emulsion is transported to a satellite 
facility that further treats the emulsion for sale. Much 
like at a separator tank, sales also occur at this point, but 
operators often elect instead to transfer the oil to a tank 
battery facility where it is further treated and then me-
tered at a Lease Automatic Custody Transfer ("LACT") 
meter and loaded onto trucks or into pipelines. Though 
other entities do so, during the time period in question 
ExxonMobil rarely sold [***4] its oil directly from 
separator tanks in the immediate vicinity of the well, 
instead transporting most of the oil to other facilities. 
When purchases were made in the well's vicinity, the 
purchase price was adjusted downward to account for the 
remaining impurities and transportation costs, among 
other things. In one transaction, the price paid by the 
purchaser was reduced from a posted price of $ 12.79 per 
barrel to $ 9.29 per barrel. 
[*P5] The Tax Commission's general practice in 
calculating the severance tax due on oil has apparently 
been to base the tax on the price of the oil at the actual 
point of sale. Thus, oil sold from the separator tank, with 
its price adjusted downward, would be taxed at a per-
centage of that lower price, whereas oil sold from the 
battery facility would be taxed at the same rate, but on a 
higher purchase price. 
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
P6 The Auditing Division of the Tax Commission 
("Auditing Division") denied ExxonMobil's request for a 
refund of severance taxes ExxonMobil believed it had 
overpaid. ExxonMobil appealed that decision to the Tax 
Commission, which bifurcated the factual issues of what 
amount of tax was due and paid from the [***5] legal 
issue of the appropriate point for calculating the tax. The 
Tax Commission held a formal hearing on the second 
issue. 
[*P7] ExxonMobil argued that the statutory provi-
sions regarding the severance tax required the Auditing 
Division to value the oil at the well site, which is the 
point of removal from the earth. The Auditing Division 
argued that valuation should occur at the point of actual 
sale. [HNl]The relevant statutory provisions require that 
the tax be computed based on "the value, at the well, of 
the oil or gas," which is defined as "the value of oil or 
gas at the point production is completed." Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 59-5-102(lXa), -101(19) (2000). The Tax 
Commission's decision was split with two of four com-
missioners agreeing with the Auditing Division that 
valuation should occur at the point of sale, which it 
equated with completed production. One commissioner 
agreed with ExxonMobil that valuation should occur at 
the point of removal but gave that interpretation prospec-
tive application only. The fourth commissioner also 
agreed that ExxonMobil's interpretation was correct, 
without the prospective application limitation. Thus, the 
Tax Commission [***6] denied ExxonMobil's request 
for a refund. ExxonMobil requested reconsideration of 
the decision, which was granted. 
[*P8] Upon reconsideration by the Tax Commis-
sion, two commissioners remained convinced of the cor-
rectness of the Auditing Division's position, while the 
other two commissioners remained convinced of the cor-
rectness of ExxonMobil's position. As to the prospective 
application of the rule, two commissioners now agreed 
that ExxonMobil should be entitled to relief. The Tax 
Commission [**709] held, based on the tie vote be-
tween the four commissioners, that the Auditing Division 
prevailed and value would be measured at the point of 
sale for purposes of determining whether ExxonMobil 
was entitled to the requested refund. Because ExxonMo-
bil's refund request depended upon valuation at the point 
of removal, summary judgment was entered against 
ExxonMobil. [HN2]Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. section 
78-2-2 (2002), ExxonMobil petitioned this court for re-
view of the Tax Commission's decision. 
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[*P9] On appeal, ExxonMobil argues that the Tax 
Commission erred by concluding that ExxonMobil was 
not the prevailing party. ExxonMobil contends that al-
lowing the use of the [***7] Auditing Division's inter-
pretation of the method for calculating the severance tax 
allows the Commission to impose a tax despite the statu-
tory mandate that the Tax Commission act only with a 
quorum of three agreeing. Utah Code Ann. ? 59-1-205 
(2000). Further, ExxonMobil argues that the Commis-
sion erred by declaring the Auditing Division the prevail-
ing party despite the tie vote because there is a statutory 
presumption against taxation that cannot be overcome 
without a majority vote. Lastly, ExxonMobil argues that 
the Tax Commission's interpretation of the statutory lan-
guage in question was in error. Because we resolve this 
matter by statutory interpretation, we need not consider 
ExxonMobil's arguments regarding the failure of three 
members of the Tax Commission to agree on an interpre-
tation. 
ANALYSIS 
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
[*P10] [HN3]As questions of law, we review the 
Tax Commission's interpretations of the various statutory 
provisions implicated in this matter for correctness, ac-
cording the Tax Commission's interpretations no defer-
ence. Atlas Steel, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 2002 
UT112.P14,61P.3dl053. 
II. [***8] INTERPRETATION OF STATUTORY 
PROVISIONS 
[*P11] Two particular statutes require our review. 
Both address valuation, providing: 
[HN4]Each person owning an interest . . . in oil or 
gas produced from a well in the state, or in the proceeds 
of the production, shall pay to the state a severance tax 
equal to 4% of the value, at the well, of the oil or gas 
produced, saved, and sold or transported from the field 
where the substance was produced. 
Utah Code Ann. $ 59-5-102(T)(a) (2000). 
[HN5]"'Value at the well' means the value of oil or gas at 
the point production is completed." Id § 59-5-101(19). 
These two provisions form the crux of the dispute now 
before us. 
[*P12] ExxonMobil contends that the severance tax 
is to be calculated based on the value of the oil or gas at 
the point at which it is removed from the earth. It argues 
that although the value of its interest at the well is further 
defined as the point of completed production, the terms 
"production" and "extraction" are used synonymously 
and render extraction as the appropriate measure. Id. £ 
59-5-101(20). Read in light of section 59-5-103, which 
establishes methods of valuation, including [***9] the 
net-back method in which the costs of post-extraction 
transportation and processing are deducted from the ul-
timate purchase price, id § 59-5-101(7), ExxonMobil 
argues that its interpretation is compelled by the sever-
ance tax statutes. 
[*P13] The Tax Commission counters that the 
statutory requirement that production be completed prior 
to valuation of the oil or gas necessarily implies some 
post-extraction alteration. Also citing the valuation 
section, 59-5-103, the Tax Commission argues that the 
clear statutory preference for valuation by reference to an 
arm's-length contract supports its view that measuring 
the value of the oil and gas at the point at which it is re-
moved from the earth is inappropriate given the dearth of 
sales that occur at the immediate point of removal. 
Rather, the Tax Commission suggests that, in the sim-
plest of situations, sales occur after at least some of the 
BS&W is removed from the emulsion by storage in the 
separator tank. Thus, the argument goes, the clear prefer-
ence for valuing the oil or gas by utilizing an arm's-
length contract price would be ill-served by a statutory 
scheme set up to determine value at a [**710] point 
where such arm's-length [***10] sales rarely occur. 
[*P14] [HN6]When we interpret a statute, we look 
first to the plain language. In re Worthed 926 P.2d 853, 
866 (Utah 1996). In doing so, we give all statutory provi-
sions relevance and meaning independent of other provi-
sions. Id. [HN7]If we find ambiguity in the statute's lan-
guage, we look to legislative history and other policy 
considerations for guidance. Id. [HN8]In the context of a 
taxation statute, our evaluation of ambiguous language 
also requires us to '"construe taxation statutes liberally in 
favor of the taxpayer, leaving it to the legislature to clar-
ify an intent to be more restrictive if such intent exists.'" 
County Bd. of Equalization of Wasatch County v. Utah 
State Tax Comm'n, 944 P.2d 370, 373-74 (Utah 1997) 
(quoting Salt Lake County v. State Tax Comm'n, 779 
P.2d 1131, 1132 (Utah 1989)). The statutory language in 
question in this case is not plain and we must resort to 
policy considerations and our mandate that taxing stat-
utes be construed in favor of the taxpayer.' Id. 
1 We are not aware of, and the parties have not 
cited, any relevant legislative history that would 
inform our interpretation of the statutory provi-
sions in question. 
[***H] [*P15] Although both ExxonMobil and 
the Tax Commission make reasonable arguments sup-
porting their respective interpretations of the point of 
valuation of oil and gas for severance tax purposes, nei-
ther party's position completely reconciles with the 
valuation provisions of the severance tax statutes. 
Section 59-5-103 [HN9]establishes the methods for 
computing the value of oil or gas for severance tax pur-
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poses. It provides that the value is to be "established un-
der an arm's-length contract for the purchase of produc-
tion at the well." Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-103(1) (2000). 
[HN10]In the absence of an arm's-length contract, 
section 59-5-103 provides that other methods may be 
employed in descending order to determine value. First, 
value may be ascertained by reference to a non-arm's-
length contract if it "is equivalent to the value received 
under comparable arm's-length contracts for purchases or 
sales of like-quality oil or gas in the same field." Id. § 
59-5-103(l)(a). The next method of valuation allowable 
under section 59-5-103 allows one to determine value 
"by consideration of information relevant in valuing like-
quality oil or gas at the well in the same field [*** 12] or 
nearby fields or areas such as: posted prices, prices re-
ceived in arm's-length spot sales, or other reliable public 
sources of price or market information." Id. § 59-5-
103(l)(b). The final method, allowed if no other method 
is applicable, is the net-back method, which allows a 
producer to determine the value of the oil or gas by de-
ducting costs of transporting and processing from the 
eventual sales or market price, up to 50% of the value of 
the oil or gas. Id S§ 59-5-103(n(c). -101(7). The legisla-
ture's preferences for valuing oil and gas are clear from 
this statute. [HNll]Our interpretation of the statutory 
language in sections 59-5-101 and -102 must give mean-
ing and relevance to each of the valuation methods. In re 
Worthed 926 ?.2d at 866. 
[*P16] The Tax Commission reasonably concludes 
that "production" supposes an alteration of the oil or gas 
from its natural state. However, were we to accept the 
Tax Commission's position, the net-back valuation 
method would have no relevance—a result we do not 
favor. Id. The Tax Commission's position could never 
result in utilization of the net-back method because any 
sale would necessarily be at the point of [***13] com-
pleted production, where the Tax Commission argues 
that valuation must occur. Thus, the transportation and 
refinement costs deducted under the net-back method 
would never be deductible from a sale price, but would 
merely represent added value taxed as part of the in-
creased purchase price. Additionally, [HN12]the statu-
tory definition of "well" notes that a well is an "extrac-
tive means." Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-101(20) (2000). 
This seems to indicate physical extraction from the earth, 
not the extraction of oil or gas from other impurities fur-
ther down the line as the Tax Commission suggests. 
[*P17] ExxonMobil's interpretation would require 
us to slight the statute, albeit to a lesser degree. Its posi-
tion is roughly that oil or gas should be valued at the 
point of removal from the earth. This argument ignores 
the clear legislative preference for valuation [**711] by 
reference to actual contracts for sale, id § 59-5-103(1), 
because, according to the Tax Commission's unchal-
lenged factual findings, sales rarely occur without at least 
some separation in a separator tank or some further re-
finement. 
[*P18] Both parties support their interpretations by 
offering [***14] various definitions of "production" 
from different dictionaries, cases from other courts, and 
unrelated statutes. Neither the Tax Commission's posi-
tion nor ExxonMobil's position is compelled by the lan-
guage of the statute. Likewise, there is no indication that 
the legislature intended its use of the word "production" 
in section 59-5-101(19) to be given any of the definitions 
suggested by the parties. 
PI 9 Given the ambiguity in the statute, we are compelled 
to consider the general principle that we "construe taxa-
tion statutes liberally in favor of the taxpayer, leaving it 
to the legislature to clarify an intent to be more restric-
tive if such intent exists." County Bd. of Equalization of 
Wasatch County, 944 P.2d at 373-74 (internal quotations 
omitted). Applying this standard, [HN13]we hold that 
valuation does not necessarily occur at the point of sale, 
wherever that may be, but rather in the immediate vicin-
ity of the point at which the oil or gas is physically re-
moved from the earth. However, to qualify as the point at 
which production is complete, that point must be one at 
which sales of the oil and gas may actually occur. 
[*P20] "At the well," where "production [***15] 
is complete," read in light of the language favoring 
valuation by reference to an arm's-length contract price 
but allowing other methods, including the net-back 
method, contemplates valuation in the immediate vicinity 
of the point of removal from the earth. The Tax Commis-
sion's position regarding the statutory meaning is incor-
rect because it relies heavily on one interpretation of the 
phrase "production is completed" instead of harmonizing 
the various definitions at play in the severance tax stat-
ute. Accepting the Tax Commission's position would 
lead to a widely disparate tax, based not on the value of 
oil or gas actually removed from the ground and thus 
taken from the state's pool of natural resources, but based 
on the sales and marketing strategies of the various inter-
est holders. A producer with testing facilities on site 
could sell directly from the well's valve structure and pay 
a much smaller tax than one who removes impurities or 
otherwise refines the oil to sell at the battery facility. The 
language of the statute contemplates calculation within 
the immediate vicinity of the point of removal from the 
earth, but it also compels calculation at some point where 
sales are not a [***16] distinct rarity. 
[*P21] The nature of the industry is such that sales 
rarely, if ever, occur directly from the valve structure, 
which appears to be the point of valuation advocated by 
ExxonMobil. The statute, however, assumes a market for 
oil and gas at the point of valuation. Thus, although we 
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hold that valuation is to occur in the immediate vicinity 
of the point of removal, it need not necessarily occur at 
the point of physical removal from the earth. There ap-
pears to be a market for oil and gas taken from the sepa-
rator tanks near the well head. The Tax Commission so 
found, although it apparently believed the failure of 
ExxonMobil to sell much of its oil and gas at that point 
was fatal to its claim for valuation there. This was error. 
Valuation of the oil and gas at the separator tank allows 
valuation to occur while the oil and gas are in a relatively 
raw state, at the earliest possible, yet practicable, point of 
sale. Where no separator tank is used, valuation may still 
occur by reference to the value of similar oil at separator 
tanks in the same field. This valuation system allows the 
use of the preferences outlined in section 59-5-103, 
unlike the methods proposed by [***17] either of the 
parties. 
[*P22] The Tax Commission and amici believe an 
interpretation other than that adopted by the Tax Com-
mission would drain state revenues at a time when reve-
nue is relatively scarce. We are not blind to the impact of 
our holding on the amount of taxes collected and distrib-
uted to various governmental entities, but any concerns 
we have with the reduction of revenue are not properly 
assuaged by an ends-based statutory interpretation. If the 
legislature established the severance tax scheme to real-
ize a specific revenue target and our interpretation of its 
statutory language does not provide that level [**712] 
of revenue, the legislature may amend the relevant stat-
utes to provide for a different calculation of the tax that 
will achieve the desired revenue. 
III. APPLICATION OF OUR DECISION 
[*P23] The revenue concerns cited by the Tax 
Commission and amici convince us that application of 
our prospective effect doctrine is appropriate in this case. 
[HN14]When invalidating the actions of a taxing author-
ity, we have long recognized that our decisions may be 
given prospective effect to protect the solvency of gov-
ernmental entities and to avoid administrative and finan-
cial [***18] hardship caused by retroactive application 
of rules contrary to those relied on by the taxing authori-
ties. See, e.g., Rio Alzom Corp. v. San Juan County, 681 
P.2d 184, 196 (Utah 1984). [HN15]We recognize, how-
ever, that preventing the retroactive application of the 
rule to ExxonMobil, which has expended considerable 
time and resources to attack the actions of the Tax 
Commission, would both deprive ExxonMobil of the 
fruits of victory and "potentially . . . discourage other 
litigants from challenging [actions] of questionable va-
lidity." V-l Oil Co. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n. 942 P.2d 
906, 914 (Utah 1996) (citing Rio Alzom. 681 P.2d at 
196), vacated on other grounds, 942 P.2d 915 (Utah 
1997). We give our holding this selectively prospective 
application because we are convinced that retroactive 
application could result in large refunds of taxes already 
collected and spent by governmental entities. Although 
the full breadth and depth of the impact is not immedi-
ately apparent from the record before us, no doubt it 
would be substantial and involve funds already budgeted, 
collected, and spent. Large refunds of money already 
[***19] collected and spent would pose a great burden 
on the amici revitalization funds and other relatively 
small governmental entities operating on correspond-
ingly small budgets. Thus, whether in refund requests or 
deficiency proceedings, as to all but ExxonMobil the rule 
announced today is to have prospective application only. 
CONCLUSION 
[*P24] We reverse the Tax Commission's determi-
nation that severance taxes should be based on the value 
of oil and gas at the point of eventual sale. Valuation 
must occur in the immediate vicinity of the well, with the 
oil and gas remaining in a relatively natural state. Al-
though ExxonMobil is entitled to further adjudication of 
its claim for a refund, as to other parties who may have 
refund requests, deficiency proceedings, or similar mat-
ters pending before the Tax Commission, our holding is 
to apply prospectively only. Reversed. 
[*P25] Chief Justice Durham, Associate Chief Jus-
tice Durrant, Justice Parrish, and Justice Nehring concur 
in Justice Wilkins' opinion. 
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under its official seal, directed to the sheriff of any county of 
the state commanding the bheriff tu levy upon and sell the 
real and personal property of the taxpayer found within the 
county for the payment of the amount due, with the added 
penalties interest and the cost of executing the warrant, and 
to return the warrant to the commission and pay to it the 
mone}^ collected within a specified time but not more than 60 
days from the date of the warrant 1988 
59-5-113. Collection by warrant — Effect of warrant. 
(1) Immediately upon receipt of the warrant m duplicate, 
the sheriff shall file the duplicate with the clerk of the district 
court in that county The clerk shall enter in the -judgment 
docket, in the column for judgment debtors, (a) the name of the 
delinquent taxpayer mentioned in the warrant, and (bj in 
appropriate columns, the amount of the tax or portion of i t and 
penalties for which the warrant is issued and the date when 
the duplicate is filed The amount of the warrant so docketed 
has the force and effect of an execution against all personal 
property of the delinquent taxpayer, and also is a hen upon the 
real property of the taxpayer against whom it is issued in the 
same manner as a judgment duly rendered by any district 
court and docketed in the office of the clerk 
(2) The sheriff shall proceed in the same manner as is 
prescribed by law in respect to executions issued against 
property upon judgments of a court of record, and is entitled to 
the same fees for services in executing the warrant 1988 
59-5-114 Limitation of actions. 
(1) (a) Except as provided in Subsections (l)(c) through (f), 
the commission shall assess the amount of taxes imposed 
under this part, and any penalties and interest, within SIL 
years after a taxpayer files a re turn 
(b) Except as provided in Subsections (l)(c) through (f), 
if the commission does not make an assessment under 
Subsection (l)(a) within six years, the commission may 
not commence a proceeding for the collection of the taxes 
after the expiration of the six-year period 
(c) Notwithstanding Subsections (l)(a) and (b), the 
commission may make an assessment or commence a 
proceeding to collect a tax a t any tune if a deficiency is due 
to 
(l) fraud, or 
(u) failure to file a return 
(d) Notwithstanding Subsections (l)(a) and (b), begin-
ning on July 1, 1998, the commission may extend the 
period to make an assessment or to commence a proceed-
ing to collect the tax under this part if 
(1) the six-year period under this Subsection (1) 
has not expired, and 
(u) the commission and the taxpayer sign a writ-
ten agreement 
(A) authorizing the extension, and 
(Bj providing for the length of the extension 
(e) If the commission delays an audit at the request of 
a taxpayer, the commission may make an assessment as 
provided in Subsection (l)(f) if 
(l) the taxpayer subsequently refuses to agree to 
an extension request by the commission, and 
(u) the six-year period under this Subsection (1) 
expires before the commission completes the audit 
(f) An assessment under Subsection (l)(e) shall be 
d) for the time period for which the commission 
could not make an assessment because of the expira-
tion of the six-year period, and 
(n) in an amount equal to the difference between 
(A) the commission's estimate of the amount of 
taxes the taxpayer would have been assessed for 
the tune period descnoed in Subsection (l)(f)(i), 
and 
(B) the amount of taxes the taxpayer actually 
paid fo^ tne time ppn or) described in Subsection 
(l)(f)(i) 
(2) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (2Kb), the commis-
sion may not make a credit or refund unless the taxpayer 
files a claim with the commission within six years of the 
date of overpayment 
(bj Notwithstanding Subsection (2)(a), begmning on 
July 1, 1998, the commission shall extend the period for a 
taxpayer to file a claim under Subsection (2)(a) if 
d) the six-vear period under Subsection (2)(a) has 
not expired, and 
(u) the commission and the taxpayer sign a writ-
ten agreement 
(A) authorizing the extension, and 
(B) providing for the length of the extension 
1998 
59-5-115. Disposit ion of taxes collected — Credit to 
General Fund. 
All taxes imposed and collected under Section 59-5-102 shall 
be paid to the commission, promptly remitted to the state 
treasurer, and except those taxes otherwise allocated under 
Section 51-9-305, 59-5-136, or 59-5-119, credited to the Gen-
eral Fund 2008 
59-5-116. Disposit ion of certain taxes collected on Ute 
Indian land. 
(1) Except as provided in Subsection (2), there shall be 
deposited mto the Umtah Basm Revitahzation Fund estab-
lished in Section 9-10-102 
(a) for taxes imposed under this part, 33% of the taxes 
collected on oil, gas, or other hydrocarbon substances 
produced from a well 
(I) for which production began on or before June 
30 1995, and 
(n) attributable to interests 
(A) neld m trust by the United States for the 
Tribe and its members, or 
(B) on lands identified m Pub L No 440, 62 
Stat 72(1948), 
(b) for taxes imposed under this part, 80% of taxes 
collected on oil, gas, or other hydrocarbon substances 
produced from a well 
(lj for which production began on or after July 1, 
1995, and 
Ui) attributable to interests 
(A) held in t rust by the Umted States for the 
Tribe and its members or 
(B) on lands identified in Pub L No 440, 62 
Stat 72 (1948), and 
(c) for taxes imposed under this part, 80% of taxes 
collected on oil, gas, or other hydrocarbon substances 
produced from a well 
(l) for which production began on or after January 
1, 2001 and 
(n) attributable to interests on lands conveyed to 
the tribe under the Ute-Moab Land Restoration Act, 
Pub L No 106-398, Sec 3303 
(2) ta) The maximum amount deposited m the Umtah 
Basm Revitahzation Fund ma3' not exceed 
d) $3,000,000 in fiscal year 2005-06 
(n) $5,000 000 <m fiscal year 2006-07, 
(in) $6,000,000 in fiscal years 2007-08 and 2008-
09 and 
dv) for fiscal vears beginning with fiscal year 2009-
10, the amount determined by the commission as 
described in Subsection (2)(b) 
(b) d) The commission shall increase or decrease the 
dollar amount described in Subsection (2)(a)(m) by a 
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percentage equal to the percentage difference be-
tween the consumer price index for the preceding 
calendar year and the consumer price index for cal-
endar year 2007-08; and 
(ii) after making an increase or decrease under 
Subsection (2)(b)(i), round the dollar amount to the 
nearest whole dollar. 
(c) For purposes of this Subsection (2), "consumer price 
index'* is as described in Section 1(f)(4), Internal Revenue 
Code, and defined in Section (l)(f )(5), Internal Revenue 
Code. 
(d) Any amounts in excess of the maximum described 
in Subsection (2)(a) shall be deposited into the General 
Fund. 2007 
59-5-117, 59-5-118. Repealed. 1988 
59-5-119. Disposition of certain taxes col lected on Na-
vajo Nation Land located in Utah.. 
(1) Except as provided in Subsection (2), there shall be 
deposited into the Navajo Revitaiization Fund established in 
Section 9-11-104 for taxes imposed under th i s par t beginning 
on Ju ly 1, 1997: 
(a) 33% of the taxes collected on oil, gas, or other 
hydrocarbon substances produced from a well: 
(i) for which production began on or before June 
30,1996; and 
(ii) attributable to interests in U t a h held in t rust 
by th& United States IQT -the Nrofey* Naftoa and i ts 
members; and 
(b) 80%. of the taxes collected on oil, gas, or other 
hydrocarbon substances produced from a well: 
(i) for which production began on or after July 1, 
1996; and 
(ii) attributable to interests in U t a h held in trust 
by the United States for the Navajo Nation and its 
members. 
(2) (a) The maximum amount deposited in the Navajo 
Revitaiization Fund may not exceed: 
(i) $2,000,000 in fiscal year 2006-07; and 
(ii) $3,000,000 for fiscal years beginning with fiscal 
year 2007-08. 
(b) Any amounts in excess of the maximum described 
in Subsection (2)(a) shall be deposited into the General 
Fund. 2007 
59-5-120. Exempt ion. 
Beginiihig on January 1, 2006 and ending on June 30, 2016, 
no severance tax required by this chapter is imposed on oil and 
gas produced, saved, sold, or transported if the oil or gas 
produced, saved, sold, or transported is derived from: 
(1) coal-to-liquids technology; 
(2) oil shale; or 
(3) tar sands. zooe 
PART 2 
MINING SEVERANCE TAX 
59-5-201. Definitions. 
As used in this part: 
(1) (a) "Metalliferous minerals" includes any ore, 
metal,'or other substance containing the following: 
(i) aluminum; 
(ii) antimonj7; 
(hi) arsenic; 
(iv) barium; 
(v) beryllium: 
(vi) bismuth; 
(vii) boron; 
(viii) cadmium; 
(ix) calcium; 
ix) cerium; 
(xi) cesium; 
(xii) chromium; 
(xiii) cobalt; 
(xiv) columhium; 
(xv) copper; 
(xvi) gallium; 
(xvii) germanium; 
(xviii) gold; 
(xix) hafnium; 
(xx) indium; 
(xxi) iridium; 
(xxii) iron; 
(xxiii) lanthanum;-
(xxiv) lead; 
(xxv) lithium; 
(xxvi) manganese; 
(xxvii) mercury; 
(xxviii) molybdenum; 
(xxix) nickel; 
(xxx) osmium; 
(xxxi) palladium; 
(xxxii) platinum; 
(xxxiii) praseodymium; 
(xxxiv) rare earth metals; 
(xxxv) rhenium; 
(xxxvi) rhodium; 
(xxxvii) rubidium; 
(xxxviii) ruthenium; 
(xxxix) samarium; 
(xl) scandium; 
(xli) selenium; 
(xlii) silicon; 
(xliii) silver; 
(xliv) sodium; 
(xlv) strontium; 
(xlvi) tantalum; 
(xlvii) telmrium; 
(xlviii) thallium; 
(xlix) thorium; 
(1) -tin; 
(li) t i tanium; 
(lii) tungsten; 
(liii) uranium; 
(liv) vanadium; 
(lv) yttrium; 
(lvi) zinc; or 
(Ivii) zirconium, 
(b) "Metalliferous minerals*' does not include: 
(i) chloride compounds or salts; 
(ii) potash; 
(iii) rock, sand, gravel, and stone products; 
(iv) gypsum; 
(v) sulfur or sulfuric acid; 
(vi) gem stones; 
(vii) ammonium, nitrate; 
(viii) carbon dioxide; 
(ix) oil, gas, coal, and all carboniferous mate-
rials; or 
(x) phosphate. 
(2) "Mine" means an operation for extracting minerals 
and includes any deposit of valuable metalliferous miner-
als that are being extracted from a natural deposit, or a 
secondary source including tails, slag, waste dumps, or 
other similar secondary source, whether in solution or 
otherwise. 
(3) "Mining" means the act,-process, or work of extract-
ing minerals from their natural occurring environment or 
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the Court's desire to "avoid administrative hardship . . . caused by retroactive application of 
rules contrary to those relied on by the taxing authorities" is unfounded as demonstrated by 
facts in this case inasmuch as (a) the ExxonMobil decision did not announce a new rule of 
law, and (b) the issuance of refunds causes no more administrative hardship than the 
issuance of deficiency assessments. 
The distinctions represented by this appeal are so significant that they "render the 
prior decision [on prospective relief in ExxonMobil inapplicable." Munson, 2007 UT 91, 
p. 20. 
B. The Facts of this Appeal Demonstrate That the Court Misapprehended 
the Impact General Application of the ExxonMobil Decision Would 
Have on the Solvency of "Amici Funds and Other Relatively Small 
Governmental Entities ." 
1. Revitalization Funds do not benefit from Unocal's severance 
taxes because Unocal's wells are not on Indian lands. 
The ExxonMobil Court applied the prospective effect doctrine based on its "desire to 
protect the solvency of governmental entities." 2003 UT 53 f^ 23. The only entities 
specifically discussed in the ExxonMobil decision were the Revitalization Funds. However, 
the Revitalization Funds only have an interest in severance taxes paid for production 
from wells located on Indian lands. Utah Code Ann. §§ 59-5-116 and 119. 
The Navajo Nation is located in the southernmost part of San Juan County. 
http://www.southeastutah.org/en/menu/110/. The Uintah Basin Revitalization Fund is 
funded by severance taxes from wells on Ute Indian Land located in Duchesne and Uintah 
Counties. Utah Code Ann. § 9-10-101 et seq. The wells for which ExxonMobil sought 
20 
severance tax refunds were located on Navajo Nation lands in San Juan County. In contrast, 
the Lisbon Field is located in the northeastern part of San Juan County and is comprised 
entirely of federal and State of Utah leases. R. 12 at f 10, 665. The Lisbon Field is not 
located on Indian lands, therefore, no portion of the severance taxes paid by Unocal is 
remitted to the Amici Funds. 
Under Utah law, severance tax payments for oil and gas produced from wells which 
are not located on Indian lands do not impact revitalization funds. See Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 59-5-116 and 119. This crucial distinction was not acknowledged during the ExxonMobil 
litigation. In fact, the potential impact on Revitalization Funds was never discussed until 
after ExxonMobil had already filed its appellate brief and the issue was only addressed by the 
Revitalization Funds. As a result "the issue did not benefit from the focus and refinement 
afforded issues actually litigated in the lower courts." Munson, 2007 UT'91, p. 21. 
Apparently unaware of the fact that severance taxes only impact the Revitalization Funds 
when the wells were located on Indian trust lands., this Court, in its haste to protect the 
solvency of the Revitalization Funds and "other [unnamed and unidentified] relatively small 
governmental entities/' refused to apply the ExxonMobil decision to "other parties who may 
have refund requests, deficiency proceedings, or similar matters pending before the Tax 
Commission" regardless of whether or not those other parties operated on Indian trust lands. 
ExxonMobil, ^ 24. 
The Court's concern for the solvency of the Revitalization Funds also suggests that it 
may not have been aware that the Revitalization Funds would not have been affected by any 
21 
refund requests for periods prior to June 30,1996. The statutory provision requiring 
deposits of severance taxes into the Navajo Nation Revitalization Fund did not go into effect 
until July 1, 1997 3 Thus, for 4 and Vz years of the six year period represented by 
ExxonMobil's refund request, the Navajo Nation Revitalization Fund had not received any 
of ExxonMobil's severance tax overpayments 4 
Clearly the decision to deprive Unocal and other severance taxpayers whose wells 
were not on Indian lands of the nght to rely on ExxonMobil to ensure that their assessments 
were based on the value of oil and gas "in the immediate vicinity of the well, with the oil and 
gas remaining in a relatively natural state," is error This Court should conclude, as it did in 
Munson that "it is appropriate to overrule" the selective prospectivity limitation in the 
ExxonMobil decision Munson, 2007 UT 91, % 21 
2. There are no "other relatively small governmental entities'5 which 
would have been impacted by retroactive application of 
ExxonMobil 
The ExxonMobilCourt's application of the prospective effect doctrine was also based 
on its concern for the solvency of "other relatively small government entities" which would, 
3
 The statute requinng deposits into the Uintah Basin Revitalization Fund went into 
effect July 1,1996 Utah Code Ann §§59-5-116 
4
 Evidence produced by the Division in another severance tax appeal further revealed 
that the Court's concern for the impact on the Revitalization Funds was misplaced inasmuch 
as the refunds to ExxonMobil were issued from the State's General Fund and the Navajo 
Nation Revitalization Fund was not impacted Division's Supplemental Answers to 
Petitioners7 First Set of Interrogatories, Requests for Production of Documents and Requests 
for Admissions, River Gas Corp, v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, Case No 060700437 (2nd Dist Ct., 
Dec 7, 2006), Admissions Nos 1, 2, 9-12, pp 8, 10 A copy of these Answers is attached in 
the Addendum as pp 0053-0064 
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presumably, be burdened by the ExxonMobil decision. This concern was misplaced because, 
by law, all severance taxes, except for a portion of those collected for oil and gas production 
on Indian lands, is remitted to the state's General Fund. Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-115 The 
"General Fund" is defined as "monies received into the treasury and not specially 
appropriated to any other fund " Utah Code Ann § 67-4-2 (2007) Thus there were no 
"other relatively small governmental entities" which would have been directly impacted by 
the retroactive application of the ExxonMobil decision. 
The ExxonMobil Court did not have the benefit of a record on the prospective effect 
limitation requested by the Amici Funds. Consequendy, the Court invoked the prospective 
effect doctrine in a manner which has resulted in significant injustice for other severance 
taxpayers, particularly those who, like Unocal, paid their severance taxes based on the correct 
interpretation of the statute and have been assessed deficiencies 
3. The revenue concerns cited by the ExxonMobil Court are not 
implicated by deficiency proceedings. 
The Exxonmobil Court's determination that only prospective rekef would be granted 
was based on its acceptance of the Commission's representations that broad-scale refunds 
would jeopardize the solvency of the amici revitalization funds ExxonMobil^ 2003 UT 53 at 
f 23.5 However, the Court's decision to foreclose taxpayers with deficiency assessments 
from relying on ExxonMobil, results in an unfair windfall for the government and, when the 
wells are on Indian trust lands, the revitalization funds. Pittsburgh & Midway Coal Mining Co, v. 
5
 This representation appears to have been unfounded in kght of the fact that the 
refund issued to ExxonMobil was issued directly from the State General Fund and there was 
no effort by the State to obtain reimbursement from the Navajo Nation Revitalization Fund. 
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Department of Avenue, 161 Ariz. 1355 138-39, 776 P.2d 1061, 1064-65 (1989) ("An honorable 
government would not keep taxes to which it is not entitled."). 
Deficiency assessments do not implicate the same considerations as refund requests 
inasmuch as the revenue concerns cited by the ExxonMobil Court have no application when 
the taxpayer is challenging a deficiency. If Unocal prevails in its appeals, government entities 
would not be disgorging any revenue. However, the result of the Commission's 
interpretation of ExxonMobil is that the government receives a $2.2 million windfall at 
taxpayer expense. 
By making the prospective effect doctrine applicable to deficiency assessments, the 
Court ensures that taxpayers who, like Unocal, paid their severance taxes using the correct 
interpretation of law, will be forced to pay millions of dollars in deficiency assessments.6 The 
Commission suggests that the Court intended this result in the name of equality, however, 
the quest for "equality" is not a justifiable excuse for assessing deficiencies against taxpayers 
who have paid their taxes in accordance with the correct interpretation of the applicable 
statute. The facts of this case demonstrate that the ExxonMobil Court's decision to bar relief 
in deficiency proceedings based on fiscal concerns implicated by refund actions for wells 
located on Indian lands should not be given any precedential effect 
6
 In a recent Tax Court decision addressing the prospective application of the 
ExxonMobil decision, the Court stated: "It is worth noting that upon questioning from the 
Court neither attorney could cite to one tax case, other than ExxonMobil, that prospectively 
applied its holding to deficiency proceedings." Ruling and Order on Plaintiffs Motion to 
Compel, River Gas Corp. v. Utah State Tax Com/n'n, Case No. 060700437 (2nd Dist C t 
O c t 19,2006). R. 1106. 
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